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The Emperor's Clothes
The Emperor's Clothes:
Evaluating Head of
State Immunity Under
International Law
Mary Margaret Penrose'
How are they to settle with the leaders of old? Some settlement there must be, to
terminate, if that is possible, the ongoing struggle between the two [regimes] and
to establish the legitimacy of the victors. But in what sense can this be, in what
sense (if any) ought it to be, a legal settlement? The [leader] is brought to trial in
violation of the laws of the old regime, the only laws he acknowledges; he is
judged in the name ofpolitical or legal principles to which he never consented. He
is judged, moreover, by a court whose authority he does not recognize (or which
he only recognizes under duress), a court composed in large part, if not entirely, of
his political opponents. How can this be justice done?2
I. Professor Penrose graduated from Pepperdine Law School, J.D. and the University of Notre
Dame Law School, LL.M, in 1993 and 1999, respectively. She teaches Federal Civil
Procedure, Criminal Procedure Constitutional Law and International Human Rights. She
has two text books in circulation, both co-authored, one on Education Law and one on
Federal Civil Procedure, both published in 2009. In addition, she remains an active
member of the Texas Bar and is currently serving as counsel to seven Texas death row
inmates during their final habeas corpus appeals. Professor Penrose believes strongly in
"Equal Justice Under Law" and hopes to one day see a true functioning international legal
system where justice triumphs over power and influence. She is grateful to all her students
over the years that have taught her every bit as much as she has tried to teach them. This
next generation of lawyers has the ability to solve many of the shortcomings noted in this
and similar articles.
2. MICHAEL WALZER, REGICIDE AND REVOLUTION: SPEECHES AT THE TRIAL OF Louis XVI,
70 (1974).
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I. The Shadow of its Threat
Vox etpraeterea nihil4
Saddam Hussein, the former President of Iraq, sat in the dock of an Iraqi
courtroom as a criminal defendant. Though many celebrated his trial as a long-
awaited legal reckoning, the truth is that this domestic trial follows two noteworthy
events: first, a rejected offer of exile by the United States, and, second, a military
takeover of Iraq by other nations. In neither instance is the prosecution of Saddam
Hussein a traditional invocation of the legal power of indictment and arrest.
Rather, exile - and, one would assume, immunity from prosecution - was
proffered in an attempt to avert the international military operation that continues
to plague Iraq. Prosecution only occurred because the overtures of exile were
rebuffed and Saddam Hussein was ultimately defeated, overthrown, and captured
by U.S. military forces.
5
Yet, even as thousands heralded the placement of Saddam in the dock,
thousands more challenged the propriety and legality of trial as Saddam was
granted constitutional immunity under the domestic Iraqi constitution purportedly
governing these proceedings. While international tribunals and third-state
prosecutions, like Spain's attempt to prosecute General Augusto Pinochet and
Belgium's attempt to prosecute Ariel Sharon, may ignore domestic amnesties,
Iraq's former leader may have had a valid legal challenge to his prosecution. Thus
continues the tumultuous effort to bring former heads of state to justice for acts of
torture, disappearances, rapes, murder and even genocide.
To date, most attempts at prosecuting heads of state have fallen short. At best,
3. Ruti Teitel, The Law and Politics of Contemporary Transitional Justice, 38 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 837, 837 (2005) (brilliantly articulating the head of state situation, "Slobodan
Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, Hissene Habre, Augusto Pinochet, Charles Taylor. There have
never been more political leaders in the dock, or, under the shadow of its threat").
4. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 828 (1974) ("voice and nothing more"). While this
author desires the state of law to permit prosecutions against heads of state, available proof
and legal precedent reminds we are not there yet. Rather than succumb to the pressure to
cheer on each legal "victory," it is hoped that this article will truly pave the way for
establishing a legal structure that transparently empowers prosecution under proper legal
precedent and principle.
5. This is not the only historical instance of offers of exile to leaders. The same was proffered
to, and twice accepted, by Napoleon Bonaparte. Eventually, Napoleon died in his exile at
St. Helena Island. Likewise, King Louis XVI was offered exile and, in fact, some during
his trial argued for his exile in the nascent America.
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such attempts, even the modern attempts stretching from Iraq to Yugoslavia to
Sierra Leone, have occurred under less than ideal circumstances, often far, far
away from the actual place of alleged crime, or so distant in time to have lost some
of its meaning. While academics, international lawyers and human rights advocates
all praise the "Pinochet precedent" as paving the way for prosecuting deposed
despots and ending the luxurious exiles of former dictators, in the end Pinochet
was released from custody and returned home to Chile where he was embroiled in
legal challenges for his alleged crimes until his death at age 91 in 2006. The
Pinochet precedent never resulted in a conviction.
Following a clear and developing pattern, the ultimate transfer of Slobodan
Milogevi6 to the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia ("ICTY")
followed political defeat, loss of support at home and a viable threat of economic
sanctions. In the truest sense, a price was placed on the head of Milogevid that
many in the Yugoslavian government were not prepared to ignore. 6 The Serbian
Prime Minister, Zoran Djindji6, against the wishes of his President and political
rival Vojislav Kogtunica, capitulated to the demands for Milogevi6's extradition
and delivered Milosevic to an American airbase in Bosnia.7 As a result, Djindji6
was shortly thereafter assassinated. Yugoslavia, though a reluctant participant in
the extradition process, received over $1.25 billion dollars from NATO allies for
the surrender of The Hague's most renowned indictee. 8 Much like Pinochet before
him, Milogevi6, who traveled freely to the United States and was instrumental in
the Dayton Peace Accords process, finally lost sufficient favor and power to find
himself vulnerable to prosecution.
So, too, was the fate of Milogevi6's contemporary, Radovan Karad~i6, who was
finally apprehended and transferred to the ICTY thirteen years after his purported
crimes. Karad~i6, the former Bosnian Serb leader, apparently lived openly in
Belgrade under an assumed identity, Dragan Dabi6, as a faith healer. He is charged
with genocide for the massacre of nearly 8,000 Muslim boys and men during the
siege at Srebrenica in July, 1995. Though Karadfi6 now sits in the same dock
where Milogevi6 spent his last days and months, KaradCi6's trial begins with many
6. Scott Grosscup, The Trial of Slobodan Milosevic: The Demise of Head of State Immunity
and the Specter of Victor's Justice, 32 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 355, 364 (2003)
(indicating that President George W. Bush released an initial $50 million dollars in aid to
Serbia conditioned upon the arrest and detention of Slobodan Milosevic).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 365 (noting that several members of the newly elected Yugoslavian government
resigned over the extradition - an act, regardless of the financial ramifications, many
national politicians disagreed with).
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of the dilatory practices engaged in by his predecessor Milogevi6. At his initial
appearance, Karadi6 refused to enter a plea and informed the court he would be
representing himself. Karadi's trial is expected to last many months, possibly
even years. And the trial begins as the ICTY is winding down its operations in the
Netherlands under the ICTY's mandate. Karadi's trial may become the most
enduring symbol of both the ICTY's existence and its legacy.
Simply placing a former head of state in the dock does not assure justice. In
fact, both Milogevi6 and Hussein - and more recently, Taylor, Karad~i6 and Al
Bashir-used their status as criminal defendants to challenge the legality of the
proceedings against them; to juxtapose the alleged international crimes of NATO
and the United States against their own atrocities; and to attempt to use their
respective stages to transform the legal proceedings into a mockery of justice.
While the tu quoque argument has not succeeded in the legal sense, the respective
"you did it as well" arguments furthered by these leaders brings perverse attention
to the political nature of their prosecutions. Ultimately, Milogevi6 died of a heart
attack in his prison cell at The Hague without any legal resolution of the claims
levied against him. To some he is a martyr, to others a monster. But despite the
best efforts of the international community, neither he nor Pinochet will ever be a
convict. In contrast, Saddam Hussein was quickly convicted and ceremoniously
executed by hanging after a swift appeal. As the world continues to be embroiled
in wars and genocides, one can only surmise the fate of other former leaders like
Karadi6 and others placed under arrest or currently in trial, such as Charles
Taylor, Omar Hassam Ahmad Al Bashir and Alberto Fujimori.
These few examples only begin to explore the shortcomings of prosecuting
heads of state. In every case herein chronicled, the leader is only "brought to
justice" once he has lost political power and international clout. Other world
leaders, whose crimes appear equally gruesome and legion, remain living their
lives without fear of prosecution. While the cause of prosecuting heads of state is
undoubtedly noble, the legal pedigree for such prosecutions is vulnerable. Despite
the growing mandate of a few international treaties, state practice continues to
weigh heavily in favor of according former heads of state complete immunity from
prosecution for torture and other alleged international crimes. This article explores
existing state practice relating to the prosecution of heads of state. Regardless of
the burgeoning legal opinions proclaiming, ipse dixit, that customary law
empowers countries to arrest and prosecute former heads of state for alleged acts
of torture, disappearances, rape and murder, history - both recent and past -
provide limited support for these aspirational pronouncements.
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This article will further expose the limits of prosecuting heads of state by first
addressing the historical Westphalian approach to sovereignty and head of state
prosecution. Because the nation-state was historically deemed impenetrable and
the United Nations Charter protects the sovereign equality of all nation states,
heads of state have routinely avoided prosecution for alleged international crimes
through either inertia (the many in exile), comity (Saudi protection of Amin via
their welcome), political compromise (Emperor Hirohito of Japan during World
War II) or deference to the head of state as the state itself. This article challenges
that the usual precursor to prosecuting a former head of state is military or political
defeat and a radical change in support at home. The transfers of Milogevi6,
Karad~i6 and Charles Taylor provide three obvious examples. The future status of
Omar Al-Bashir, whose arrest warrant was issued by the International Criminal
Court ("ICC") in March, 2009, will provide an important benchmark for this
theory.
Next, this article will evaluate the historical instances of head of state
prosecution, with particular emphasis placed on the inconsistent approach of the
Allies following World War II. While great efforts were made to prosecute the
leaders of the Nazi regime, General Douglass MacArthur expressly secured
immunity for Emperor Hirohito of Japan in exchange for the Emperor's
participation in securing peace in Japan. Following the unconditional surrender of
Japan, the Allied forces determined that the political calculus of immunity was
more important than securing the prosecution of the Emperor, the acting head of
state. Most surprising is the absolute silence in the post-World War II legal
decisions discussing head of state immunity regarding Emperor Hirohito's express
provision of immunity and the clear distinction between the statute governing the
Nuremberg Tribunal and the statute governing the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East (IMTFE), commonly referred to as the Tokyo Tribunal. While the
former tribunal statute expressly permitted prosecution against heads of state, the
IMTFE conspicuously omitted this provision. Thus, during World War II, one
tribunal consciously chose to grant head of state immunity.
This article will trace the legal developments relating to head of state immunity
from World War I, World War II and continuing to the Rwandan, Yugoslavian,
Sierra Leonean and Sudanese conflicts that have spurred some form of
international tribunal or attempt at prosecution. International treaties and case
decisions will be presented and analyzed. Likewise, observations and commentary
from scholars will be evaluated. While only one international treaty, the Genocide
Convention, speaks directly to the relevancy of head of state status for prosecution,
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most of the wartime peace treaties and their attendant international tribunal statutes
more clearly elucidate a lack of head of state immunity. Nevertheless, the source
of many of these prosecutions continues to be military force or political downfall
that presents a defeated defendant. From these few tribunal statutes and this lone
treaty, modern courts have strained to find a consistent practice regarding head of
state immunity. Rather than relying on actions, however, these modern courts
dogmatically overemphasize the hollow written words relating to head of state
immunity and ignore the empty actions or actual practice. Even as Pinochet flew
home to Chile without succumbing to any criminal prosecution, overzealous
advocates were praising the legal precedent established. The precedent, we must
admit, includes Pinochet's de facto immunity. The recent examples of Hussein,
Milogevi6, Karad~i6 and Taylor may, however, finally be signaling a sea change of
action, not simply rhetoric.
Finally, this article will inquire whether the exchange of amnesty via offers of
exile are not, perhaps, a preferable option to the unfulfilled attempts at prosecuting
former heads of state. If the question is peace or justice - assuming a choice must
be made between the two - amnesty and exile may be a small price to pay to avert
military action and expensive, dilatory prosecutions that may not, in the end,
deliver justice. The question is not simply one of economic costs, but one also
assessing the lost opportunity costs sacrificed in vain attempts to prove a
disempowered dictator face "justice."While I, too, am all for the ideal of
prosecuting individuals for atrocities committed against civilians, right now heads
of state largely still sit only in the shadow of its threat.
lI. Revisionist History
Vae Victis9
The prosecution of heads of state is, historically speaking, anomalous. There
have been sparse domestic prosecutions and intermittent international prosecutions
but nothing regular, nothing systematic and nothing that suggests a normative
practice. Rather, the names of heads of state etched in history as having suffered
prosecution, and occasionally punishment, are rare enough that one can count them
on a single hand: King Charles of England, Louis XIV of France, and Napoleon -
9. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 828 (1974) ("woe to the vanquished").
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the first two "tried" by domestic courts, the third dealt with in an extra-legal
fashion. 10 Peter von Hagenbach is frequently named as the first individual to be
condemned by an international tribunal for war crimes, but he was merely a
commander and not really a head of state." Much more common when a former
leader or dictator is dethroned is the act of exile or ostracizing - an act oft repeated
in our modern times.
The seeds of punitive exile were sown very early on with the case of Napoleon
Bonaparte. In fact, exile was unsuccessfully offered to King Charles I and
unsuccessfully argued as an appropriate sanction for Louis XVI. In the end,
neither king received banishment, and executions took the place of exile.
Curiously, the trials of both royal men are absent from modern discussion of head
of state immunity. As the king literally was the state, this omission is rather
remarkable.
A. The Inviolability of Kings - Regicide 2 or Justice
Le roi est mort, vive le roi
13
Before Hussein, before Pinochet, there were the royal defendants: King Charles
I of England and King Louis XVI of France. While kings had previously
abdicated or been murdered, none had previously been placed on trial, due to the
assumption that the king was not subject to the jurisdiction of ordinary courts.
These trials presented the first clear assertion, by heads of state, of the defense of
10. Jordan J. Paust, ILSA Panel Oct, 18, 2003, at Loyola University New Orleans-Panel on
History of International Tribunals Prior to Nuremburg: Selective History of International
Tribunals and Efforts Prior to Nuremberg, 10 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 207, 208 (2003)
("One of the early recognitions of criminal responsibility of a head of state occurred at the
Congress at Aix-La-Chappelle in 1818 when the Congress, without formal trial, found
Napoleon guilty of waging wars against peace. After his capture in 1815, he had been
banished to the Island of St. Helena where he died some six years later.").
11. Id. at 207 ("Peter von Hagenbach, who served as Governor of territory under Duke Charles
of Burgundy, was tried before what can be termed an international tribunal for the
oppression of persons under his charge and for actions against the 'laws of God and man,'
including responsibility for murder, rape and pillage.").
12. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 587 (1974) (Literally translated, "regicide" means
simply "one who murders a king" or "the murder of a king"). The executions of both
Charles I and Louis XVI are considered by many to be "regicide" despite each execution
following a trial and judgment.
13. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 824 (1974) (Literally translated is "the king is dead,
long live the king").
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sovereign immunity. Much like those sustained by Hussein, Milogevi6, Taylor,
Karad~i6 and, in a much more limited fashion, Pinochet, the defense of immunity
raised by both regal defendants fell flat upon their respective "judges." However,
other observers were not as mollified or sure of these prosecutions. The problem,
as one scholar notes, was trying the king "in some legitimate court of law." 14 As
one officer purportedly declared during the trial of King Charles I, "putting the
king on trial was 'a just thing yet I know not how it may be justly done."" 'I5
In order to bring these kings to trial:
[T]he substance of the law or, more simply, the position of the king vis-6-vis the law had
to be changed. For Charles and Louis lived within a seemingly impregnable legal fortress.
Though there were major differences between English and French kings with regard to
their legislative powers, there were none at all with regard to their standing before their
own courts. They may or may not have been above the law when it came to making law,
but they were clearly beyond its (worldly) reach. It was a legal maxim in both England and
France that the king could do no wrong: le roi ne peut pas faire mal. This principle the
revolutionaries were committed to deny, and their denial was a large part of the revolution
they made.
To be a king was to be inviolable. That meant that no action of a reigning monarch,
whatever its character, could possibly be construed as a crime. The status was, strictly
speaking, a legal one only; it followed logically from the king's position as the source of
law and justice.16
Yet, despite these legal barriers, both Charles and Louis were brought to trial
domestically. Both were accused of being tyrants and committing acts of treason.
"There can be no doubt that Charles' principal sin was the levying of war. The
other allegations of murder, rape and the destruction of property were ancillary to
this. Charles was tried largely for bringing war and its attendant destruction on the
land." ' 7 The literal language of the "indictment" spoke of the cruel and unnatural
wars that spilt "much innocent blood," wasting the public treasury and obstructing
and decaying trade among nations. 18 But, at issue, much like the trials of modem
leaders today, was the waging of a costly and damaging war and its attendant
atrocities. 19
14. CHARLES CARLTON, CHARLES I: THE PERSONAL MONARCH 348 (1995).
15. Id.
16. WALZER, supra note 2, at 35.
17. THE REGICIDES AND THE EXECUTION OF CHARLES 1 128 (Jason Peacey ed., 2001).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 127-128. The actual language of the charge read in pertinent part as follows:
That the said Charles Stuart, being admitted King of England, and therein trusted with a
limited power to govern by and according to the laws of the land, and not otherwise; and
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Hoping to avert a crisis, negotiations continued with King Charles to avoid
prosecution. One option that was readily dismissed by the King was exile. 20 In
order to protect against any claim that he had abdicated the throne, Charles I
constantly refused exile but entertained thoughts of fleeing to either France or
Holland.2' Even in his limited captivity merely awaiting trial, the dour attitude of
the dethroned monarch emphasizes the punitive nature of incapacitation and, in
longer periods, exile.
22
Whether the machinations that resulted in these unique proceedings were
legally proper no longer seems to matter. Rather, the fact that two monarchies
were subjected to common forms of justice, trial and execution, revolutionized
European history and has resulted in martyrdom for both kings. Charles I and
Louis XVI were both "tried" domestically for taking their countries to war and
bringing untold atrocities upon their subjects. These trials subverted the existing
legal framework, and serve as the first legal displacement of the notion of
sovereign immunity for a head of state.
Thomas Paine, in presenting a speech on November 21, 1792, proclaimed:
by his trust, oath, and office, being obliged to use the power committed to him for the
good and benefit of the people, and for the preservation of their rights and liberties; yet,
nevertheless, out of a wicked design to erect and uphold in himself an unlimited and
tyrannical power to rule according to his will, and to overthrow the rights and liberties of
the people, yea, to take away and make void the foundations thereof, and of all redress
and remedy of misgovernment, which by the fundamental constitutions of this kingdom
were reserved on the people's behalf in the right and power of frequent and successive
Parliaments, or national meetings in Council; he the said Charles Stuart, for
accomplishment of such his designs, and for the protecting of himself and his adherents
in his and their wicked practices, to the same ends has traitorously and maliciously
levied war against the present Parliament and the people therein represented.
Id. at 128 (The author explains that "[t]he king was simply a magistrate who had committed
treason against the parliament and people by raising an unlawful and unnatural war in the
land to the destruction of the commonwealth.").
20. CARLTON, supra note 14, at 295.
21. Id. at 308 (In explaining the difficult issue facing the king, Carlton writes:
Escape therefore seemed the only way out of an intolerable situation. Charles first raised
the idea of fleeing to the Continent in early June, less than a month after he had joined
the Scots. By July he was convinced, "I am lost if I go not unto France by the end of
August," and implored his wife to make the necessary arrangements. In August, he
admitted to Ormonde that he was an "honorable prisoner." The following month he
asked his daughter, Mary, to have her husband, William or Orange, send a Dutch ship to
Newcastle, ostensibly to carry messages, but in fact to stand by to spirit him to Holland.)
22. Id. at 325 (explaining that Charles spoke of his days at Carisbrooke at "these damnable
times"). Much like Napoleon in exile on St. Helena, Charles would try to occupy his time
by walking, reading and eating.
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As to "inviolability," I would not have such a word mentioned. If, seeing in Louis XVI
only a weak and narrow-minded man, badly reared, like all his kind, given, as it is said, to
frequent excesses of drunkenness a man whom the National Assembly imprudently raised
again on a throne for which he was not made - he is shown hereafter some compassion, it
shall be the result of the national magnanimity, and not the burlesque notions of a
pretended "inviolability."
23
Thus, much like today, the question of sovereign immunity was directly
considered by the tribunals. However, perhaps due to the impure appearances of
these rudimentary attempts at judging heads of state - or, equally likely, due to the
martyred legacy of the regal convicts - later courts have not relied on these early
precedents to embolden their claims that even monarchical leaders can be tried for
inflicting war-tom horrors upon their countries.
24
Another issue born out of these proceedings was the distinction between
immunity covering the position of sovereign and immunity covering the acts
alleged to be committed. The rudimentary demarcations appear throughout the
French proceedings trying Louis XVI but, in the end, they were not deemed
decisive. The delineation between the two forms of immunity did, however,
embolden Louis' adversaries and judges to discard an otherwise unequivocal
promise of immunity in the French constitution. As courts look ahead toward
23. WALZER, supra note 2, at 130.
24. SUSAN DUNN, THE DEATHS OF Louis XVI: REGICIDE AND THE FRENCH POLITICAL
IMAGINATION 73 (David Bromwich, et al. eds., 1944). As Dunn observes the work of
another Louis XVI scholar:
Unfortunately, as Walzer suggests, the king's trial confused a political trial (not
dissimilar to an impeachment trial conducted by the American Senate), which does not
need to conform to accepted judicial procedure, with a criminal trial, which should
conform to judicial procedure, if only because the outcome may be (and was) death
rather than just impeachment or abdication. Walzer, however, also makes the reasonable
argument that "the point [of the trial] was to make a point - that the king was, like any
other citizen, liable to the law. How could that be done without a trial? And how could
the trial of the king be anything but an imperfect (which is not to say a 'sham') trial?
Walzer, goes on to make an interesting comparison between the trial of Louis XVI and
the Nuremberg trials: not unlike the king's trial, the Nuremberg trials were instruments
of collective education; they were political as well as criminal, and, on the grounds of
pure procedural justice, they were imperfect, but "necessarily imperfect." But perhaps
there is a distinction to be drawn between an international trial (based on principles of
international law, which itself may be a contradiction in terms), and a national trial that
can be expected to follow a nation's set of rules of procedural justice. The Nuremberg
trials, moreover, might be viewed as an act of closure, whereas the trial of Louis XVI
constituted not only the judicial closure of monarchical rule, but also the founding act of
a new political order, one that people hoped would be based on a constitution, on the rule
of law, republican institutions, and humanitarian ideals.
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suitably developing a legal basis for eradicating head of state immunity, these early
references should not so easily be discarded. For not only does history seem to
repeat itself - the sight of Milogevi6, Karad2i6, Taylor and Hussein arrogantly
challenging by what authority they are brought before these bodies - the wise learn
much from the legal and historical failings of their predecessors.
B. Exiling the Offender - From Elba to St. Helena
C'est magnifique, mais ce n 'est pas la gurerre25
To the shattering dismay of Europe, Elba had proved all too soon, a wholly unsuitable
and insecure place for the exile of Napoleon after his defeat by the allies in 1814. The
island was but a few miles sail from the Italian coast, or indeed from Corsica his
birthplace. For a year the Emperor had lived in mock imperial splendour [sic] there with
a small army of his own and in considerable freedom. It was of course a lilliputian court
both in influence and in magnificence compared with the grandeur of his former days in
France. He was however able to communicate without real difficulty with his supporters
in Paris and on 26th February 1815 he escapedfrom Elba and returned to France.
The allies were still squabbling among themselves at the Congress of Vienna over the
terms of settlement of their respective claims and their relative frontiers following their
overthrow of Napoleon's supremacy. When news of his escape reached Vienna the allies
recognized with shattering reality that they were now faced with the task of tackling all
over again their exhausting efforts to subjugate the man who had held them in terror for
so many years of war.
Within a hundred days fiom the time of his escape, Napoleon had assembled a new
army in France and stood ready to launch a fresh bid for the domination of
Europe .... [then] came Waterloo .... 26
The life and exile of Napoleon Bonaparte still garners vast attention today,
though usually not legal attention. Whether this notoriety is due to Bonaparte's
escape from his initial exile in Elba or due to his later exile on the island of St.
Helena is less relevant than the precedent set by his actual banishment. Twice
expelled, Bonaparte remains a heroic, if not tragic, figure that was relegated to
spending his last six years on the island of Saint Helena in the middle of the
Atlantic Ocean. In exile, Bonaparte was removed from all usual freedoms and was
25. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 820 (1974) ("it's magnificent, but it isn't war").
26. JAMES KEMBLE, ST. HELENA DURING NAPOLEON'S EXILE: GORREQUER'S DIARY 6
(1969).
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at once both discontent and emasculated. This was considered the ultimate penalty
to be imposed upon one whose former power wielded many great privileges. On
St. Helena, the simple privilege of reading and receiving mail or walking freely
along the coastline was strictly controlled by his captors.27
Bonaparte despaired greatly in his exile. His departure from continental Europe
reminded all of his staggering defeat and his resulting displacement from civilized
society. Although he was given moderately impressive living quarters,28
Bonaparte was not free to walk amidst the grounds and was, eventually, subjected
to bars placed around the house to provide additional security.29
The matters that enraged Napoleon and the regulations that he regarded as insulting were
connected with the granting of passes to Longwood [his living quarters] and permission to
see Napoleon, the refusal of Lowe to allow attempts to initiate secret correspondence
between those at Longwood and people outside, and more particularly the refusal to permit
27. DESMOND GREGORY, NAPOLEON'S JAILER: LT. GEN. SIR HUDSON LOWE 133 (1996).
While Bonaparte referenced the pleasure with which his captor, Sir Hudson Lowe,
mistreated him, in truth, there were strict regulations placed upon Bonaparte's captivity by
governmental instructions:
Most of Napoleon's complaints were outside Lowe's control, bound as he was by
Bathurst's instructions. This went for Napoleon being treated as a prisoner of war and
all that entailed; for his having to be seen by a British officer every morning and every
evening; for his being denied the title of "Emperor"; for some of his followers being
deported ... for the censorship of correspondence in and out of Longwood [Napoleon's
home]; for being accommodated at Longwood (a house about which he had many
complaints); and for the climate of St. Helena as experienced on the exposed Longwood
plateau, where there was little shelter from the sun and none whatever from the constant
wind, and which could be very damp at times and moreover was rat infested).
28. Id. at 135. Bonaparte complained vehemently about his living quarters as they were, no
doubt, a far cry from his Emperor's quarters. However, as one author notes, Bonaparte
refused offers to improve his housing:
As regards alternative accommodation, Napoleon refused to reply to Lowe's queries
about the planning of a new house at Longwood and refused to have additional rooms
built onto the existing structure, which was undoubtedly far too cramped and very far
from waterproof; he could not endure the noise the workmen were bound to make. As
Norwood Young writes, Napoleon always imagined that before the new house could be
completed he would be dead or out of the island.
29. Id. at 136 ("Napoleon chose to make a great deal of fuss about the installation of iron
railings around the precincts of the new house at Longwood. Lowe had insisted on this
because it would mean posting fewer sentries, but perhaps he was being insensitive to the
objection voiced by Napoleon that the railings served to emphasize his detested status as a
prisoner of war.").
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the use of the imperial title.
30
As one author notes:
Absolute power spoils a man, and Napoleon, whose profoundly human qualities still
astonish us, must have suffered more at St. Helena from having to adapt himself to
ordinary life even than from remoteness, isolation and illness: his long battle with Hudson
Lowe was centred [sic] entirely round his view that sovereignty was essentially permanent,
and the anointing of a king had incontestable validity.
3
'
Bonaparte's mail was read, books and other gifts withheld, 2 his movements
severely curtailed and scrutinized, and his impact in Europe largely evaporated. In
effect, he had lost all aspects of sovereignty: his title, his honor, his influence and
his freedom. Exile was a merciful, though effective, punishment. And, in
accepting exile, any claim of sovereignty was forever lost.
To be in exile is to be a stranger in a foreign land. The place of exile will never
be "home" in the traditional or truest sense and the consequent inability to freely
travel serves as a continual reminder of one's defeat or surrender. A person in
exile remains always a visitor and must rely on the benevolence of their guardians
for a secure existence. The recent extradition of Charles Taylor underscores how
fleeting the peace of one in exile can be. Caught at the border trying to escape,
Taylor was taken into international custody and extradited to face trial. How light
must one sleep who remains a visitor dependent upon the hospitality of his
keepers?
The romanticized descriptions of those currently or recently in exile
occasionally, though usually wrongfully, portray carefree living and luxurious
peace. Instead, many that have chosen exile realize that the "choice" was
necessitated by defeat and its attendant loss of privileges. These individuals are
condemned to die a slow, isolated death. When the family of Idi Amin, the former
President of Uganda, sought to return his remains to his native land, the overtures
were refused and Amin was buried in Saudi Arabia. A similar indignation was
placed upon Bonaparte who, though given a funeral reserved for those of the
highest rank, was not permitted to have his name inscribed upon his tomb. 3
Because Sir Hudson Lowe refused the name "Napoleon" to be set upon the tomb
without also adding the term "Bonaparte," the tomb remained without
30. Id. at 132.
31. GILBERT MARTINEAU, NAPOLEON'S ST. HELENA 9 (Frances Partridge trans., John Murray
Ltd. 1968) (1966).
32. GREGORY, supra note 27, at 135.
33. Id. at 163.
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identification. 34 It is the slight indignations such as these that serve to remind
those in exile that their power is gone, infinitely gone. Rather than die a martyr as
Charles I and Louis XVI, Napoleon's tomb at his place of death reveals he died as
an ordinary, if not common, emasculated man.
Beyond the punitive features of exile, there is a secondary feature inquiring into
the process through which exile is achieved. Modernly, many dictators and former
leaders voluntarily chose exile, recognizing that remaining a deposed leader in
their current country could make them physically or legally vulnerable. Further,
some choose exile as a means of escaping justice - in essence, as a "choice"
favoring a form of freedom over prosecution in return for stepping down from a
particular regime or position. Bonaparte did not choose exile in the modern sense;
exile was thrust upon him as a surrendered prisoner of war.
One historian notes that the exile option was actually the third choice deemed
appropriate for the fallen Emperor. 35 While the Prussians desired that Bonaparte
simply be shot, the British favored some form of trial process - to occur in
France.36 Only upon realization that a trial was not currently feasible did the
British resort to banishment. 37 As Jonathan Bass observes, "[w]hat was largely
missing was legalism. To this day, 'the Napoleonic precedent' means the use of
extralegal means to get rid of an enemy.,
38
Unlike the proceedings involving Charles I and Louis XVI, Bonaparte was
accused on not only committing treason against his own citizens, but also
committing war crimes by executing Prussian prisoners. 39  The question of
amnesties from prosecution was clearly discussed for soldiers and military officers.
Much like the succeeding efforts at Leipzig and Nuremberg to follow, the Allies
initially sought the prosecution of some one hundred men. 40 But, as was later true
following World Wars I and II, the initial list was severely curtailed and only a
few, representative prosecutions actually took place.4 1 The most notable trial
34. Id.
35. GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS 38 (2000).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 38-39 (Bass continues that, however, "there were weak stirrings of some kind of
British legalism, an embryonic preference for postwar trials rather than arbitrary
methods.").
39. Id. at4l.
40. Id. at 46.
41. BASS, supra note 35, at 46. ("For the most part, the Bonapartists [sic] were seen as traitors,
usurpers, and enemies - but not as war criminals.").
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involved Michel Ney, a man Bonaparte considered "the bravest of the brave" for
refusing orders to capture Bonaparte following his escape from Elba. 42 In time,
Ney was tried by the Chamber of Peers "on behalf of Europe" in Luxembourg
rather than at home before an ordinary tribunal.43 He was adjudged guilty and put
to death before a firing squad. 4
Yet, this awful fate would not befall either Bonaparte or the Kaiser a mere
hundred years later. Instead, Napoleon fell upon the mercies of the British and,
without any semblance of trial or prosecution, was banished to St. Helena to spend
the remainder of his days in isolated exile. And despite assurances following
World War I that the Kaiser would be prosecuted, he was spared trial and
permitted to exist in exile peacefully in Holland. Although a domestic trial was
considered in each instance, the French made it quite clear that they were incapable
of trying Bonaparte and the Allies feared he might again, if given over to French
custody, escape.45  And, the Dutch believed that maintaining the peace by
permitting the Kaiser to remain in exile was more important than fulfilling the
prosecution promise in the Treaty of Versailles. Thus, the solution of exile
succeeded as the lowest common denominator among the Allies. Twice. No
execution. No trial. Exile.
One hundred and four years after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, in 1919, the British
government found itself thinking through the fate of Wilhelm H by reconsidering what it
had done to Napoleon Bonaparte.... In meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet and in
inter-A llied conferences, the fate of Napoleon came up repeatedly.
What had changed since 1815? In most regards, the way the Allies had dealt with the
Bonapartists [sic] was in line with realism. Enemies were treated as enemies, no more
and no less. Wellington did not see his opponents as war criminals. Nor was he much
concerned with legal niceties like trials. British leaders did not even discuss putting
Napoleon before an international tribunal before whisking him off to Elba and to St.
Helena.
This is afar cry from Nuremberg. The great powers knew they wanted to dispose of
Napoleon, and they were willing to use extralegal methods to do so. Napoleon did not
have the benefit of anything like the stern insistence of George Clemenceau or Henry
Stimson or (maybe) Madeline Albright that enemy leaders were also war criminals who
had to be put on trial, not merely gotten rid of as undesirables. In short, 1815 largely saw
the exercise of naked state power. In that sense, the aftermath of the Hundred Days makes
the aftermaths of the Armenian genocide, World War I and World War H all the more
42. Id. at 47.
43. Id at 48.
44. Id
45. Id. at 52-53.
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striking. They did not both with a trial for Napoleon in 1815; and yet they were obsessed
with trials a century later.
46
In truth, as the following section revels, these later obsessions are not actually
with trials themselves as much with the ideals that trials promote. Peace and
stability, it is perceived, is best solved through prosecution and punishment. Yet,
given the first opportunity to turn to an international tribunal in 1919, the Allied
governments promised a justice they were unwilling to deliver.
The Allies, in the Treaty of Versailles, unequivocally asserted they would
prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm II. However, the Kaiser fled to neighboring Holland
and was protected by the Dutch government. The end of World War I resulted in a
peace treaty explicitly promising to prosecute the defeated head of state. Yet, the
prosecution never happened. At this point, the idea of prosecution still did not
triumph over the cleaner option of exile. The promise was for prosecution. The
reality was continued exile. Claims that the treatment of Napoleon led modem
humanity directly to a process of prosecution ignore all too readily the truth of
Leipzig and the legacy of abandoned prosecutions.
46. Id. at 37 (emphasis added). While Bass asserts that the Allied forces did not resort to an
international tribunal for Bonaparte, a French trial was considered and proposed by the
British. But, as set forth above, the French, themselves, did not think a domestic trial
provided a feasible undertaking under the nascent regime.
47. Paust, supra note 10, at 208-09 (Professor Paust explains that the issue of head of state
immunity was deliberated and decided in the 1919 Report of the Commission on the
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties presented to the
Paris Peace conference:
Importantly, the Report stated a "desire to state expressly that in the hierarchy of persons
in authority, there is no reason why rank, however exalted, should in any circumstances
protect the holder of it from responsibility when that responsibility has been established
before a properly constituted tribunal. This extends even to the case of heads of states.
An argument has been raised to the contrary based upon the alleged immunity, and in
particular the alleged inviolability, of a sovereign of a state. But this privilege, where it
is recognized, is one of practical expedience in municipal law, and is not fundamental.
In view of the grave charges which may be preferred against - to take one case - the ex-
Kaiser - the vindication of the principles of the laws and customs of war and the laws of
humanity which have been violated would be incomplete if he were not brought to trial
and if other offenders less highly placed were punished.)
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C. Empty Promises of Prosecution - From Leipzig to Leipzig
C'est plus qu 'un crime, c'est unefaute48
Napoleon's defeat during the battle of Leipzig led to his initial exile off the
coast of Tuscany on a small island, Elba. 49 Because Napoleon easily escaped his
limited captivity on Elba, many view this attempted exile as a failure. It is quite
fitting then, to recognize that the next noteworthy failure in international criminal
justice also took place at Leipzig.
The empty promises of prosecution began with the Treaty of Versailles where
in Article 227 the international community was assured:
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William 1I of Hohenzollern, formerly
German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of
treaties.
A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the
guarantees essential to the right of defence [sic]. It will be composed of five judges, one
appointed by each of the following Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great
Britain, France, Italy and Japan.
In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international policy,
with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the
validity of international morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it
considers should be imposed.
The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of the
Netherlands for the surrender to them of the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on
trial.
Yet, the Emperor was never surrendered and the pledge set forth in Article 227
never fulfilled. Accordingly, one of the main provisions of the peace treaty ending
World War I rang hollow and no justice was attempted. Perhaps this is the first
evidence of a political compromise where peace was valued over justice.
However, as becomes quite obvious years later, peace was not sustained.
In the mid-1940s, the world witnessed horrific acts of warfare aimed not only at
military enemies but also at civilian populations. World War II ushered in many
remarkable events: Pearl Harbor, the Battan death march, the rape of Nanking, the
concentration camps of Germany and Poland, the fire-bombing of London and the
48. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 820 (1974) ("it's worse than a crime, it is a
blunder").
49. The Battle of Leipzig, also known as the Battle of Nations, ended in October 1813.
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atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. All of these tragedies resulted in
humanitarian cries of "never again." To secure this vow, the Allied forces
established two separate and distinguishable war crimes tribunal. The first
tribunal, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, was established in
Germany by the Allied forces of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet
Republic and France.50  Each of these four countries provided a judge and an
alternate for the tribunal, none of which could be challenged by the defendants.
5 1
The Nuremberg Tribunal had jurisdiction over the "crime against peace ' 52 (i.e.,
waging a war of aggression), "war crimes," 53 and "crimes against humanity."5 4 In
50. Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat, 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Statute] (Agreement between the United States of
America and the French Republic, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics respecting the prosecution and
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis. The Constitution of the
International Military Tribunal provided in Article I as follows:
In pursuance of the Agreement singed on the 8
t
h day of August 1945 by the Government
of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French Republic, the
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, there shall be established an
International Military Tribunal for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major
war criminals of the European Axis).
51. Id. at art. 2 (Article 2 of the Nuremberg Statute provided that "[t]he Tribunal shall consist of
four members, each with an alternate. One member and one alternate shall be appointed by
each of the Signatories."); Id. at art. 3 (Article 3 of the Nuremberg Statute provided that
"[n]either the Tribunal, its members nor their alternates can be challenged by the
prosecution, or by the Defendants or their Counsel.").
52. Id. at art. 6(a) (announcing that crimes against peace included "namely, planning,
preparation, initiation or waging a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the
accomplishment of any of the foregoing.").
53. Id. at art. 6 (b) (Article 6(b) defined war crimes as follows:
[N]amely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but
not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deporation to slave labor or for any other
purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private
property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity).
54. Id. at art. 6(c) (Article 6(c) provided that crimes against humanity included:
[N]amely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts
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addition, Article 6 provided a catch-all conspiracy charge holding that "leaders,
organizers, instigators and accomplices participating" in planning or executing of
any of the foregoing crimes could likewise be held individually responsible.55 The
most notable provision, however, was the clear language permitting prosecution
against any individual regardless of their official position. 56 Article 7 admonished
that "[t]he official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible
officials in Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from
responsibility or mitigating punishment." 57  This one provision apparently
established the template for modem decisions involving Hussein, Milogevi6,
Karad~i6 and Charles Taylor. Article 7 is believed by many to be the beginning of
the end of head of state immunity. However, this belief is neither logically tenable
nor historically supportable. In truth, no head of state was prosecuted at
Nuremberg. And on the other side of the world, in Asia, the opportunity to
actually prosecute the vanquished Emperor of Japan was deliberately sacrificed by
the Allies.
Nuremberg's Article 7, and its historical significance, must be tempered by its
incongruity with the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(IMTFE) governing the Tokyo Tribunal - a contemporary World War II tribunal.
General Douglass MacArthur was placed in charge of creating a sister court for
East Asia to account for the many atrocities committed by Japan during the war.58
While the crimes encompassed by the IMTFE Charter are essentially identical to
those covered by the Nuremberg statute, 59 the main deviation appears in Article 6
committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of
the country where perpetrated).
55. Nuremberg Statute art. 6.
56. Id. at art. 7.
57. Id.
58. Special Proclamation, Establishment of an International Military Tribunal for the Far East,
Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East at art. 2, Jan. 19, 1946,
T.I.A.S. No. 1589 [hereinafter IMTFE Charter] (Article 2 of the IMTFE Charter provides
that "[t]he Tribunal shall consist of not less than six members nor more than eleven
members, appointed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers from the names
submitted by the Signatories to the Instrument of Surrender, India and the Commonwealth
of the Philippines.").
59. IMTFE Charter, at art. 5 (Article 5 of the IMTFE Charter provides the tribunal with the
power to try and punish Far Eastern war criminals who are charged with offenses including
crimes against peace, conventional war crimes and crimes against humanity. In addition,
conspiracy to commit any of the three listed crimes was punishable.).
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discussing the role of a defendant's position in evaluating guilt and punishment. In
stark contrast to Article 7 of the Nuremberg statute, Article 6 of the IMTFE
Charter establishes that "[n]either the official position, at any time, of an accused,
nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant to order of his government or of a
superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such accused from responsibility for
any crime with which he is charged, but such circumstances may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires."60
One cannot ignore the extraction of the phrase "whether as Heads of State" by
General MacArthur in the construction of the Tokyo tribunal. Unlike the situation
in Germany where Hitler has committed suicide and Mussolini had been hung in
Italy, Emperor Hirohito was in full control of Japan and, in fact, delivered a radio
address informing his nation of surrender on August 14, 1945. Historical evidence
now reveals that the excise of head of state language was deliberate and intended
to shield Emperor Hirohito of Japan not only from prosecution, but also from any
involvement in the IMTFE. Thus, the only real opportunity to address head of
state immunity during World War II was intentionally avoided and diminished the
true power of either tribunal to establish legal precedent for prosecuting heads of
state.
D. The Case of the Emperor
J'y suis, j'y reste 6 1
Little is mentioned regarding the conspicuous choice by the Allied forces to
protect the Japanese Emperor from facing justice.62 Rather, scholars and lawyers
60. IMTFE Charter, at art. 6.
61. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 823 (1974) (Literally translated is "here I am, here I
remain").
62. THE OTHER NUREMBERG. ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THE
UNTOLD STORY OF THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIALS (1987) at 19 (chronicling much of
the Tokyo Tribunal, little is mentioned in contemporary writings about the Tokyo Tribunal,
this excellent book is openly "puzzled [by] the fact that hardly anyone today remembers
[the Tokyo Tribunal] or attaches much importance to it. The names of the war criminals are
for the most part forgotten. So are their deeds."); Id. (In further underscoring the paucity of
contemporary reference made to the Tokyo Tribunal, Brackman continues:
Some people dimly recall a handful of Japan's atrocities during World War 11: the Rape
of Nanking, the Bataan Death March, the POWs and other slave laborers building the
Siam-Burma Death Railway, including the bridge over the River Kwai. But who
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speak confidently of customary international law and the Nuremberg precedent
without even so much as casually observing that, much like Kaiser Wilhelm before
him, the duty to prosecute the architect of Japan's war was intentionally avoided.
And although the early trials of Charles I and Louis XVI challenged and
purportedly defiled the divinity of their respective monarchies, no justification was
given - neither implicitly nor explicitly - for choosing to forego prosecution of the
Emperor. 63 In fact, the Allies hoped that by forcing the Emperor to accept an
unconditional surrender, the humanity of the Emperor would be revealed and his
perceived divine powers minimized.
Herbert Bix has provided the most thorough account of Emperor Hirohito and
the Allied decision to grant him immunity before the IMTFE. 64 Initially, the
Soviets made clear their plan to prosecute the Emperor as a war criminal. 65
Australia alone joined the Soviets in this design, but neither the United States nor
the British were prepared to indict the Emperor.66 Instead, in preparing a short list
of thirty suspects to be tried for crimes against the peace, the United States failed
to name Hirohito. 67  Likewise, the British, who named only a scant eleven
suspects, conspicuously omitted Hirohito's name from consideration.68
Only the Australians followed the language of the Charter's mandate by
including Hirohito among a "provisional list of 100" desired indictees. 69
The Australians also furnished a detailed memorandum supporting the charges against the
Emperor. Never "at any time," it stressed, was Hirohito "forced by duress to give his
written approval" to any aggressive military action. The memorandum asked rhetorically,
"[I]s his crime not greater because he approved of something in which he did not
remembers the mass murder of 18,000 Filipino men, women, and children in the town of
Lipa? Or the murder of 450 French and Vietnamese POWs at Langson, Vietnam, where
the Japanese first machine-gunned them in the legs and then dispatched the squirming
targets in a bayonet drill? At the trial we heard so many horrifying statistics that after a
while they became meaningless).
63. Id. at 86 (While the lead IMTFE prosecutor, Keenan, argued at the time of the Tokyo
Tribunal that the.Emperor was but "a figurehead," later comments belie this position - and,
even the belief); Id. (In fact, following the trial, Keenan admitted that the Allies "gave a
good deal of thought" to indicting the Emperor because "strictly legally Emperor Hirohito
could have been tried and convicted because under the Constitution of Japan he did have
the power to make war and to stop it"); Id. (As Brackman points out, "[t]hat, of course, was
the Austrailian argument when it demanded that the [Allies] indict Hirohito").
64. HERBERT P. Bix, HIROHITO AND THE MAKING OF MODERN JAPAN (2000).
65. Id. at 584.
66. Id. at 592.
67. Id
68. Id.
69. Id.
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believe?"
70
In critiquing the deliberate decision to immunize the Emperor, Bix contends:
A serious distorting effect on the selection of the Tokyo defendants, and later on the trial
itself, arose from the overwhelming U.S. military and economic domination of the Asia-
Pacific region, and from MacArthur's excessive power. But above all, distortions stemmed
from the subordination of international law to realpolitik by all the Allied governments.
Those governments tended to rank their national interests first, law and morality second.
So did Hirohito and his advisors, working covertly behind the unfolding legal drama.
Thus the Soviet delegation, on instructions from Stalin, chose to follow the leader and call
for Hirohito's indictment only if the Americans did. The representatives of the only three
Asian countries that participated in the tribunal - China, the Philippines, and India - also
sought to avoid conflict with American policy as much as possible and to pursue their own
lines of inquiry.
7 1
These decisions made by the Allied nations mirrored the political decision to
afford Kaiser Wilhelm defacto immunity following World War I. One of the first
policy documents forwarded to MacArthur from Washington instructed MacArthur
to "take no action against the Emperor as a war criminal. 72 General MacArthur's
maneuverings in affording Emperor Hirohito immunity from prosecution included
denying the prosecution any right to interrogate the Emperor and granting full
assurance that Hirohito would neither be required to give testimony before the
Tribunal nor be asked to surrender his personal papers.
73
While the Allied commanders and prosecutors shielded the Emperor from
criminal accountability, the IMTFE judges were more circumspect. Judge Webb,
70. BIX, supra note 64, at 592.
71. Id. at 593 (emphasis in original).
72. Id. at 587 (The policy document - SWNCC 57/3 - gave numerous restrictions upon what
the prosecutors could do, reserved for MacArthur alone the power to alter and reduce
punishments, and specifically relegated decisions regarding the Emperor to Washington);
Id. (As Bix astutely notes:
The supreme commander was to operate under orders from Washington and at the same
time be an international civil servant, the representative of those Allied Powers who had
signed the instrument of surrender and would now be asked to send judges and
prosecutors. MacArthur's dual role and the way he played it added to the complexity of
the ensuing trial. It blurred the nature of the tribunal's authority, and made it inevitable
that the defense would claim that the Tokyo trial was, de facto, an American
proceeding).
73. Id. at 596 (indicating that Keenan, the lead prosecutor, "denied the prosecution the right to
interrogate Hirohito; he also determined that Hirohito would neither give testimony as a
witness nor be asked to provide his diary or other private papers").
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in a separate concurring opinion, openly criticized the Allies' failure to indict and
prosecute Hirohito.74 "Webb observed that the prosecution's evidence had proved
'beyond question' the authority of the emperor when he had done what the atomic
bombs could not: stop the war. Webb also believed the emperor had a hand in
starting the war." 75 In explicitly referencing the immunity Webb believed had
been expressly granted to the emperor, he noted Hirohito's immunity "was, no
doubt, decided upon in the best interests of all the Allied Powers." 76 While
exclaiming that the decision to shield Hirohito from prosecution was "beyond his
province," Judge Webb labeled the Emperor "the leader in the crime.
77
The French judge, Henri Bernard, also wrote a dissenting opinion challenging
the Allies' partiality in protecting the Emperor from appearing as a criminal
defendant to answer for his alleged war crimes.78 In contrast, Judge Rolig of the
Netherlands and Judge Pal of India both embraced the favorable bias shown
toward Hirohito.
79
In the end, despite the clarity in language and the intrinsic promise that no
individual would be immune from prosecution, Emperor Hirohito was granted full
and express immunity before the IMTFE. 80 Thus, the spotlight continues to shine
myopically on Nuremberg as the starting point for the eradication of head of state
immunity. Yet, the contemporaneous tribunal - where the only head of state was
available for prosecution - opted for immunity over justice, peace over
prosecution.
Intellectual honesty demands that scholars and judges confess that neither the
Nuremberg Tribunal nor the Tokyo Tribunal provided any evidence that head of
state immunity had been legally eviscerated. In Japan, the Allies saw nothing
advanced by the prosecution of the Emperor. While local papers challenged that
"the emperor ... cannot continue to conceal his responsibility for war crimes" and
called for his abdication, the Allies were content with having him securely in place
to help pursue the peace. Accordingly, head of state immunity remains a
74. Id. at610.
75. BRACKMAN, supra note 62 at 387.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. BIx, supra note 64 at 610.
79. Id. at 610-11.
80. Ruth Wedgewood, International Criminal Law and Augusto Pinochet, 40 VA. J. INT'L L.
829 (1999). (explaining how "General Douglas MacArthur said that he would need another
million soldiers for the occupation of Japan if he tried to displace Emperor Hirohito.").
81. BRACKMAN, supra note 62 at 395, 111 (revealing a secret agreement between President
Truman and General MacArthur to "keep the emperor clear of any personal involvement in
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politically infused issue and may still be available to those seeking refuge in a
friendly nation or accepting the proffer of exile to avert military occupation. The
case of Hirohito supports the claim of immunity in exchange for peace and
stability, perhaps at the cost ofjustice.
III. The Legal Tautology
Post hoc, ergo propter hoc
82
In defending its own Charter and the power to try war criminals, the Nuremberg
Tribunal relied on the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 as outlawing aggressive war.
In addition, in creating a legal house of cards that has intriguingly withstood the
test of time, the Tribunal came to the determination that the Tribunal was lawful by
relying on the Hague Convention of 1907, which it claimed prohibited certain
methods of waging war; relying on the League of Nations Protocol for the Pacific
Settlement of International Disputes, a document the court immediately confesses
was never ratified; relying on Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles, the article
that indicted the Kaiser, without securing his prosecution, and called for the
creation of a special tribunal, which was never carried out; relying on Article 228
of the Treaty of Versailles which allegedly created the right of Allies to try
German war criminals, a provision that was not enforced with any vigor or
consistency; and, "the customs and practices of states."
Much like modem reliance on Nuremberg for formulation of the right to
prosecute heads of state, the Nuremberg Tribunal's reliance on the varied sources
for establishing proof of its right to proceed is logically flawed. This tautology has
spurred the greater tautology that because "it happened at Nuremberg," we have
precedent that we can resort to today. The "it" that many modem courts
erroneously contend "happened" is the abolition of head of state immunity due to
the literal language of Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter. Yet, there is an obvious
disconnect between the literal language of the Nuremberg Charter and the actual
practices of the Tribunal. As was developed more fully above, the Allied practices
did not match the language, and the only available head of state, Emperor Hirohito,
was intentionally granted full immunity by the Allied forces. The barren words
that are carelessly credited to Nuremberg as establishing guiding principles for
the trial"). (Move footnote to the end of the sentence).
82. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 826 (1974) ("after this, therefore on account of it").
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modern assessments of head of state immunity are ignored with equal equanimity
by those who forget that what Nuremberg established, Tokyo took away - both in
words and action.
What remains disturbing is not so much that undue and improper reliance is
placed upon Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter, but that the error has yet to be
rectified by later treaties and conventions. In all the international documents
embraced by the world community, only the Genocide Convention unambiguously
erases head of state immunity for the crime of genocide. Article IV of the
Genocide Convention explicitly states that "[p]ersons committing genocide or any
of the other acts enumerated in Article III shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals."83 The
Torture Convention that was heavily consulted during the Pinochet proceedings
and, ultimately, provided the limited framework for the legal opinion regarding
immunity does not plainly apply to heads of state. Rather, much like the
Nuremberg Tribunal's opinion defending its powers, the House of Lords patched
together a quilt of legal concepts and treaties that permitted the sum total to justify
the disconnected parts. And, even following the Pinochet decision, no treaty or
convention has been authored that squarely addresses the issue of head of state
immunity.
Instead, we await the vanquished and the "cedant armatage." 84  The three
clearest statements regarding head of state immunity that currently exist are found
in the statutes for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and the nascent
International Criminal Court (ICC). Each of these United Nations-supported
juridical institutions prohibits a person's status as a head of state from serving as a
basis of immunity. The identical language of ICTY and ICTR statute proclaim:
"[t]he official position of any accused person, whether as Head of State or
Government or as a responsible Government official, shall not relieve such person
of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment."' 85
83. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 4, December
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/pgenoci.htm
(Article 111, referenced in Article IV, outlaws genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide,
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to commit genocide and
complicity in genocide).
84. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 820 (1974) ("let arms yield to the toga"). This
phrase is often used to admonish that we must let military power give way to civil power.
85. Statue of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Secretary
General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council
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Likewise, the Rome Statute governing the nascent ICC provides in Article
27(1):
This statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official
capacity. In particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a
Government or parliament, an elected representative or a government official shall in no
case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of
itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
86
While the language of Article 27 explicitly mentions "Head of State" capacity,
Article 28 provides further clarity by informing that any domestic immunity or
special procedural rules that might otherwise exempt an individual from
prosecution have no bearing on jurisdiction before the ICC. 87
Still, these tribunals were not formed during times of quiet reflection or
peaceful transitions. While the ICC can be loosely claimed as being established by
the will of the international community during a time of peace, the ICC was
undoubtedly a by-product of the civil wars raging in Sierra Leone, the Congo,
Mozambique and the genocide in the Sudan. In contrast, the ICTY was formed
during the on-going war in the former Yugoslavia as an intended deterrent to
further illegal conduct. The deterrent failed. Lastly, the controversial ICTR,
which was opposed by Rwanda, was established after the ICTY and after the
international community refused to act to avert the containable genocide that
eventually engulfed and decimated Rwanda. These ad hoc tribunals were born of
war and, yet, have thus far failed to beget peace in their respective regions.
Despite the criticism occasionally levied against the ICTY and the ICTR, these
are the only two international bodies that have successfully indicted and
prosecuted heads of state. The ICTR was the first international tribunal to indict,
prosecute and punish a former head of state, Jean Kambanda of Rwanda, for
genocide. Kambanda pled guilty to the charges and is currently serving a life
sentence in a Mali prison. The ICTY actually indicted Milogevi6 while he was still
a sitting head of state, but was unable to secure his arrest until after he was
Resolution 808 (1993), art.7, U.N Doc. S/25704, Annex at 36 (1993) and S/25704/Add.I
(1993), adopted by S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), 32 I.L.M. 1192
available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statutesept08 en.pdf
[hereinafter ICTY Statute] and Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
S.C. Res. 955, art. 6 para. 2, Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (November 8, 1994) available at
http://unictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute/2007.pdf [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
86. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 27 §1, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
87. Id. at art. 27 para. 2.
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politically defeated and threats of cutting off monetary aid motivated his
countrymen to surrender him to The Hague. Unfortunately for humanity,
Milogevi6 died during his trial and, thus, there is no legal determination of his guilt
and no satisfaction of a legal punishment. But with the recent arrest of Radovan
Karad~i6 and his transfer to The Hague the ICTY still provides hope that a head of
state will be successfully prosecuted by the ICTY.
It is upon this parchment, Article 7 of the Nuremberg Charter, Article 6 of the
IMTFE Charter, Article 7 of the ICTY, Article 8 of ICTR and Article 27 of the
ICC, respectively, that we must continue to engrave norms. The words of the
United Nations' first two ad hoc tribunals are barely dry as we encounter a
burgeoning of additional ad hoc tribunals: an international tribunal for Cambodia,
the Special Court for Sierra Leone 88 and the Iraqi Special Tribunal. Many of these
recent undertakings emulate the predecessors, including the provisions relating to
head of state immunity. 89  If the words are to have more meaning than those
proffered following World War I and World War II, state practice must match our
lofty pronouncements. 90  We prosecuted Kambanda. We tried Milogevi6. We
executed Hussein. We are trying Taylor, Karad~i6 and maybe even Al-Bashir. Has
the tide finally begun to turn?
88. Statute for the Special Court of Sierra Leone, The Secretary General, Report of the
Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (2000) art. 6,
U.N. Doc S/2000/915, Annex, (October 4, 2000) available at http://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/661/77/pdf/N0066177.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter
Sierra Leone Statute]. Article 6 of the Sierra Leone Statute provides that:
2. The official position of any accused persons, whether as Heads of State or
Government or as a responsible government official, shall not relieve such person of
criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
This proscription is a verbatim copy, in all pertinent parts, of Article 7 of the ICTY Statute.
In fact, the Sierra Leone statute is a near duplicate of the ICTY statue - with a few
distinctions based largely on the distinctive hybrid nature of the Sierra Leone effort.
89. See generally, id.
90. See The Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter and the Judgment of the
Nurnberg Tribunal, Texts and Comments, [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 181, 191- 192,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/22 [hereinafter The Nuremberg Principles] (The Nuremberg Principles,
which were prepared by the International Law Commission following the Nuremberg
Tribunal and the IMTFE at Tokyo include a principle relating to head of state immunity.
The third Nuremburg Principle states as follows: "The fact that a person who committed an
act which constitutes a crime under international law acted as Head of State or responsible
Government official does not relieve him from responsibility under international law.").
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IV. Lack of Custom, Lack of Consistency
Exitus acta probat9'
On May 1, 2006, the Washington Post's lead article was titled, "Beyond the
Axis of Evil, a World of Bad Guys." One of the stories discussing numerous
"rogue leaders," challenged that "[t]here are many more Charles Taylors. 92 One
of the leaders targeted in the article as one of the "sub-Saharan Africa, rapacious
despots with bloody hands [that] traditionally die in office or retire to luxurious
exile," was Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe. 93 While the article speaks of Mugabe's
"despotic rule," nothing is said regarding the United States' express granting of
immunity to Mugabe when he was sued in United States federal court.
94
Mugabe is not the first and, undoubtedly not the last, head of state to be
graciously protected by the United States - despite the principles of universal
jurisdiction and other treaty obligations. 95 In fact, all former heads of state that
have come before American courts have been granted immunity by the Executive
Branch in every case where the United States recognized the individual as the
legitimate leader of the country. Two exceptions are the cases of Manuel Noriega
and Radovan Karad~i6, neither of whom was granted immunity because neither
was considered by the U.S. State Department to be a legitimate head of state.
96
And, equally noteworthy, Noriega was tried on drug charges and not on charges of
murder or other human rights violations. 97  Thus, the anomalous decisions
involving Noriega and Karad~i6 can be easily discarded as cases where the United
States did not embrace either as a legitimate head of state. Noriega's case does not
support the position that the court in his case found that head of state immunity is
generally inapplicable or inaccessible. Rather, the Noriega precedent stands for
91. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 821 (1974) ("the event justifies the deed").
92. Douglas Farah, African Pillagers, WASH. POST, April 23, 2006, at B I. (see source for fn
107).
93. Id.
94. Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205 (2nd Cir. 2004).
95. See Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
96. United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
97. Id. at 1511 (As the court noted, Noreiga was "the first time that a leader or de facto leader
of a sovereign nation has been forcibly brought to the United States to face criminal
charges." Id. Recounting the circumstances of arrest, the court explained that Noriega
"was flown by helicopter to Howard Air Force Base, where he was ushered into a plane
bound for Florida and formally arrested by agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency").
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the much more narrow position that while the United States does, in fact, recognize
head of state immunity, the United States chose not to recognize the applicability
of the doctrine in this case.
In explaining its ruling, the court simply noted:
In order to assert head of state immunity, a government official must be recognized [by the
United States] as a head of state. Noriega has never been recognized as Panama's Head of
State either under the Panamanian Constitution or by the United States.
... More importantly, the United States government has never accorded Noriega head of
state status, but rather continued to recognize President Eric Arturo Delvalle as the
legitimate leader of Panama while Noriega was in power.
98
The court refused Noriega's invitation to grant him head of state immunity
based on his defacto status as Panama's head of state. 99 Fearing that such decision
could "allow illegitimate dictators the benefit of their unscrupulous and possibly
brutal seizure of power," the court continued to rely solely upon the Executive
Branch's decision regarding immunity.' °° The issue, the court underscored, was
solely one of recognition - not one affected or otherwise constrained by the
broader principles of international law.' 0 ' In short, the court easily summarized its
position: "since the United States has never recognized General Noriega as
Panama's head of state, he has no claim to head of state immunity."' ' At least
domestically in the United States, the issue of head of state immunity is driven by a
single indicator: recognition by the Executive Branch. 103
Why, then, do so many herald the Noriega decision as one eradicating head of
state immunity? Noriega is clearly not a case where the head of state issue was
properly at issue because an Executive decision took this option away.' 0 4 The
issue was not whether head of state immunity, as a general matter, was available,
but rather, whether in this particular case where the United States did not
recognize Noriega as the legitimate head of state such defense was available to
him. The most striking feature of Noriega's case should be not that Noriega was
eventually tried in the United States for drug crimes, but rather, that the United
98. Id. at 1519.
99. Id. at 1520.
100. Id. at 1520-21.
101. Id. at 1520 (emphasis added) ("Indeed, deference to the Executive branch in matters
concerning relations with foreign nations is the primary rationale supporting immunity for
heads of state.").
102. Noreiga, 746 F.Supp. at 1521.
103. Tachiona, 386 F.3d at 213.
104. Noreiga, 746 F. Supp. at 1521.
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States-in cases involving the United States-does not relegate such decisions to
international treaties or customary international law. Instead, as recognized in
Tachiona, the decision of the Executive, often controlled by political calculations,
will be legally determinative. 10 5 If recognized as a head of state, head of state
immunity applies.
V. Explaining the Exceptions - Recent Cases
Exceptio probat regulam de rebus non exceptis
106
Charles Taylor "fell where others have not because he picked a fight with the
international community. And still it took years to bring him to justice, as he
benefited from the indifference of world leaders obsessed with other threats."',
0 7
These same words can be used to describe the falls of Milogevi6, Karadfi6 and
Saddam - two of whom required military action and its attendant civilian
casualties to bring them, ultimately, into the dock. The arrest and transfer of
Radovan Karad~i6 took nearly thirteen years following his initial indictment. Most
recently, an arrest warrant was issued by the International Criminal Court for Omar
AI-Bashir, the Sudanese leader. Whether Al-Bashir will ever be apprehended or
prosecuted is uncertain, at best. Unlike Milogevi6, Karad~i6, Taylor and Hussein,
AI-Bashir remains a very popular and powerful leader. More than those preceding
him, an actual arrest and prosecution of a sitting head of state such as Al-Bashir
could signal, truly, a sea change in the prosecution of heads of state.
For as many dictators as remain comfortably constrained in their respective
exiles, there are the sporadic prosecutions of but a few. In truth, prosecution is the
exception and by no means the rule. And to the extent prosecution occurs it is
nearly always after the leader has been ousted or stepped down.
A. The United States
The United States displays one of the most schizophrenic approaches toward
head of state immunity. While the United States supports, both financially and in
principle, the ICTY and ICTR approach and, at least in the abstract, third-state
105. Id.
106. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 821 (1974) ("an exception establishes the rule as to
things not excepted").
107. Farah, supra note 93, at BI.
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prosecutions like the case against General Pinochet, and Saddam Hussein before
the Iraqi Special Tribunal, the United States does not defer to any international
treaty to resolve its internal decisions regarding immunity. 08 And, unlike many
peer nations, the United States is not motivated by the Rome Statute. Instead, in
the United States, the issue of head of state immunity is wholly relegated to the
Executive Branch of government and determinations made by the Executive will
not be reconsidered or otherwise evaluated by the judiciary. 109
Thus, were Augusto Pinochet to have been arrested in the United States, the two
determinative factors regarding his claim of immunity would have been whether:
(1) the Executive wanted to bestow Pinochet the privileged status immunity
affords and (2) whether Chile wanted to preserve his "immunity for life" status.
The recent case of Robert Mugabe, the Zimbabwean President - decided in the
United States nearly five years after the Pinochet decisions - seemed entirely
unaffected by the international praise accorded Britain and its House of Lords for
their empty efforts in seeking to prosecute Pinochet.'10 The civil case against
Mugabe, filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection
Act, was based on claims of torture, assault, execution and other acts of
violence."' The district court dismissed the case against Mugabe based on head of
state immunity. 
1 1 2
On appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Second Circuit avoided the question
of head of state immunity by relying on the more narrow decision of the district
court that Mugabe received diplomatic immunity." 3 Expressing "some doubt as to
whether the [Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act] was meant to supplant the
'common law' of head-of-state immunity, which generally entail[s] deference to
108. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, at 131-132 (The court explains the state of United States' law in
this area as follows:
A head-of-state recognized by the United States government is absolutely immune from
personal jurisdiction in United States courts unless that immunity has been waived by
statute or by the foreign government recognized by the United States);
See also Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1519 (observing that "recognition of foreign governments
and their leaders is a discretionary foreign policy decision committed to the Executive
Branch and thus conclusive upon the courts") (emphasis added).
109. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. At 1519-20 (citations omitted).
110. See generally Tachiona, 386 F.3d 205.
111. Id. at 209
112. Id. at 210 ("The [district] court concluded that the executive branch's suggestion of
immunity, not the [Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act], governed immunity for heads of
state, and that the suggestion [by the Executive in favor of immunity] mandated dismissal
of the claims against Mugabe.").
113. Id.at220-21.
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the executive branch's suggestion of immunity," the Circuit Court carefully
avoided a definitive response to the question. 114 By refusing to address the head of
state issue, we must rely on prior precedents that unequivocally hold - including
the district court opinion in this case - that a suggestion by the Executive Branch
regarding immunity is dispositive." 5 The only exceptions appear to be instances
where the Executive does not recognize the individual as the legitimate head of
state.
Head of state immunity is secured by the United States government on behalf
on an individual simply by filing a "suggestion of immunity" - an obvious
misnomer since the suggestion is non-assailable and non-justiciable.' 16 Title 28
U.S.C. § 517 empowers the Executive, acting through the Department of Justice, to
file "suggestion of immunity" letters that will be binding upon the court.' 17 An
example of such letter was filed on behalf of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in a civil
action based on an alleged extrajudicial killing. The suggestion of immunity letter
explains:
The United States has an interest and concern in this action against President Aristide
insofar as the action involves the question of immunity from the Court's jurisdiction of the
head-of-state of a friendly foreign state. The United States' interest arises from a
determination by the Executive Branch of the Government of the United States, in the
implementation of its foreign policy and in the conduct of its international relations, that
permitting this action to proceed against President Aristide would be incompatible with the
United States' foreign policy interests.
1 18
The United States was apparently not governed, nor motivated, in the Aristide
case by its obligations under the Torture Convention or other international treaty.
Neither was the American government persuaded by any nascent state practice or
customary international law. Further, President Aristide's home government,
Haiti, had attempted to waive the grant of immunity on his behalf and had issued
an arrest warrant against him that the United States court ignored."' 9 Ignoring
114. Id.
115. Id. at 220 ("The district court held that Mugabe... was also entitled to immunity from suit
as head of state[] because the Government had filed a suggestion of head-of-state immunity
on [his] behalf, which, in the court's view, was dispositive.").
116. See generally Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at 1519-1520 (and applicable cases cited therein); See
also Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 131.
117. 28 U.S.C.S § 517 (LexisNexis 2008) (provides in pertinent part: any officer of the
Department of Justice may be sent by the Attorney General to . . . any district in the United
States to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court in the United
States).
118. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. at 131.
119. Id. at 133-34.
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Haiti's claims of waiver, the court explained that such determinations by Haiti
"cannot affect the court's treatment of the suggestion of immunity. The court must
rely on the Executive's determination of who is a lawful head-of-state.' 20 The
decisive fact in Aristide's case, as in both the cases of Noriega and Mugabe, was
that the United States government did not recognize the new military rulers of
Haiti and continued to act as though Aristide was the President of a country that he
had fled. 2 ' Thus, in the United States, the question of whether head of state
immunity will provide a defense in a particular case is wholly relegated to the
political decision of the Executive Branch. The United States does not
demonstrate any willingness, at this point, to be influenced by principles of
international law.
B. The Pinochet Precedent
The Pinochet case decided by the English House of Lords, eagerly received
as a legal awakening regarding head of state immunity, unfortunately, does not
provide the legal epiphany many desired.12 2 The Pinochet case is not a case about
universal jurisdiction. It did not abrogate head of state immunity generally or even
in most cases. Rather, the Pinochet case is properly considered sui generis and
might never bring the world any closer to the promise of "never again" than
Nuremberg did. To rely on the Pinochet precedent as a complete transformation of
sovereign immunity either ignores the decisions handed down by the House of
Lords or approaches the subject with an expectation that the legal basis of the
decision is less relevant than the conclusion reached.
120. Id. at 134.
121. Id. at 134 ( The decision for immunity is summarized by the court as follows:
The United States ... does not recognize the defacto military rulers of Haiti. It has
repeatedly condemned their regime .... Because the United States does not recognize
the defacto government, that government does not have the power to waive President
Aristide's immunity).
122. See, e.g., Adam Isaac Hasson, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity on
Trial: Noriega, Pinochet, and Milosevic - Trends in Political Accountability and
Transnational Criminal Law, 25 B.C. INT'L COMP. L. REV. 125, 154 (2002) (In sanguine
fashion, Mr. Hasson writes that, "[t]he Noreiga and Pinochet cases, along with the
indictment levied against Milosevic, have limited dramatically the immunity that former
heads of state can claim for criminal activity, and also illustrate the international
community's willingness to maintain jurisdiction over criminal acts conducted abroad by
such state officials.").
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But the truth regarding the Pinochet decision is that the case provides a very
limited precedent for future cases. 123 And if other countries and courts wanted to
rely upon the decision to spur a new direction, more consistent state practice would
be necessary. The Pinochet decision - as set forth by the English courts - requires
dual criminality as a basis for eradicating head of state immunity. Further, the
basis of the decision was not whether head of state immunity existed, but whether
head of state immunity had been abrogated via waiver by Chile's ratification of the
Torture Convention. The House of Lords decision relied on the statutory
construction of the Torture Convention and not on notions of customary
international law. Thus, while the cacophony of voices proclaims "victory" over
head of state immunity, this author feels compelled to admonish, "not so fast, my
friend."'124 Let us not be blinded by our noble aspirations - that a single, unique
case has completely transformed the legal landscape. Instead, we should honestly
evaluate the current doctrine and patiently attempt to build upon a tangible and
sound legal foundation.
In approaching the Pinochet case, this author is admittedly a
"proceduralist.' ' 125 '[P]roceduralists' consider justice to be a system of legal
decision-making that, while adjudicating cases individually, fits within a greater
framework of systematic accountability that is non-discriminatory in its reach,
sustainable in its force, and ultimately successful in deterring future criminal
behavior."'
126
Until we have a more consistent and non-discriminatory state practice and a
more secure doctrine regarding head of state immunity, victory should be
123. See Shahram Seyedin-Noor, The Spanish Prisoner: Understanding the Prosecution of
Senator Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, 6 U.C. Davis J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 41, 101 (2000) (With
more guarded optimism than most, the author exclaims:
The House of Lords' decision denying Senator Pinochet immunity ratione materiae for
allegations relating to the crime of torture is a monumental step towards the recognition
of fundamental human rights, and their enforcement, within domestic systems. It fulfills
the "absolutists" desire to see the guilty punished and to witness the application of the
myriad human rights treaties and customs established within the past half-century. Yet,
this new regime of domestic enforcement is unstable, selective, and, in the end,
unsuccessful in furthering the goals of criminal law) (emphasis added).
124. This phrasing has been made familiar by the former Navy football coach, Lee Corso.
Nearly every Saturday morning during college football season, Coach Corso can be heard
exclaiming "not so fast, my friend" to his co-host, Kirk Herbstreet.
125. Seyedin-Noor, supra note 123, at 43.
126. Id.
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proclaimed cautiously. The International Court of Justice's decision discussed
infra in the Congo case suggests that the Pinochet precedent may, in fact, be
limited to its unique facts.
C. Slobodan Milogevie
As one author notes, the $1.28 billion dollars in international aid offered to
Yugoslavia in exchange for extraditing Slobodan Milogevi6 to The Hague "put the
world on notice regarding the amount of money that would be necessary to bring
[a] former leader to trial."'' 27 Unfortunately, this amount only considers the funds
required for arrest and transfer. This does not even begin to cover the expenses for
detaining and trying a deposed President. Thus, the billion dollar price tag only
began to scratch the surface of the price ofjustice.
And, in the case of Milogevi6, we now know that justice - in the form of a
criminal conviction - ultimately eluded us. History will undoubtedly emphasize
that Milogevi6 was arrested, indicted, and subjected to prosecution. As a result,
Milogevi&s health faded, yet his determination never withered. Milogevi6 was
resolute to prove that he was but a pawn in the international game of realpolitik.'
2 8
His defense was as much aimed at proving the illegitimacy of the ICTY and other
international attempts at prosecuting the emasculated as it was defending against
his indictment. 129 Milogevi's antics before the ICTY were little more than a
remonstration that "the current trend in the doctrine of immunity allows
international public opinion (or the opinion in the powerful countries) to decide
who should be granted immunity" and who should be brought to justice."'
This article is not about the prosecution of Milogevi6; innumerable articles and
books have thoughtfully covered the trial itself. Instead, this article seeks to
evaluate the processes by which leaders, such as Milogevi6 and Karad~i6, are
finally transformed into criminal defendants. The status remains that former
leaders falling into political disfavor, being militarily defeated and having a bounty
successfully placed upon them is a rare situation. It is much more common to
127. Grosscup, supra note 6 at 365.
128. Michael Scharf, The International Trial of Slobodan Milosevic: Real Justice or
Realpolitik?, 8 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 389, 389 (2001) (reporting that Milosevic
chastised his ICTY panel of judges by proclaiming, "[y]ou are not a judicial institution; you
are a political tool.").
129. Id. ("Milosevic's initial trial strategy was to attempt to discredit the Yugoslavia[n]
Tribunal's legitimacy and impartiality.").
130. Grosscup, supra note 6 at 367-68.
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displace a leader and move toward peace without legal reckoning. Or, in the
alternative, to delay the reckoning until such time as the defendant/former head of
state has so fallen out of political favor that their country's will to protect them has
dissipated or is surpassed by current political needs. It is this latter scenario that
led to the arrests and transfers of Milogevi6 and, more recently, Karad~i6 to The
Hague.
Professor Michael Scharf noted the irony in Milogevi6's belated objections to
the legitimacy of the ICTY. "[lt is a bit late in the day for Milogevi6 to be
challenging the Tribunal . . . given that he recognized the legitimacy of the
Tribunal when he signed the Dayton Accords in 1995, which require the parties to
cooperate with the Tribunal."' 13' Further, "[a]ny doubt [regarding the ICTY's
legitimacy] should have been erased when Milogevi6 authorized the transfer of
Dra~en Erdemovi6 for prosecution before the Tribunal for [ErdemoviC's alleged
crimes] in the massacres at Srebrenica."'"32 Yet, Milogevi6 continued to protest the
behavior of NATO and others in the international community who remain free
from criminal scrutiny.
D. Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") is the nearest configuration to an
international court that exists. Much like its criminal counterpart, the ICC, the ICJ
relies on the voluntary submission of nation-states to its jurisdiction and their
continued cooperation for enforcement of decisions. Approximately two years
after the House of Lords' decisions in Pinochet, the ICJ was faced with a similar
question of whether diplomatic immunity precluded one nation-state (Belgium)
from issuing an international arrest warrant against the Minster for Foreign Affairs
of another nation-state (Congo). 133 The importance of this decision lies not in the
literal issue submitted-whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Congo was
immune for alleged crimes against humanity - but more in the assessment of state
practice encapsulated in the ICJ's decision.' t34 Speaking generally to the issue of
immunities, the Court noted that "in international law it is firmly established
131. Scharf, supra note 128 at 394.
132. Id.
133. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14)
134. Id. at para. 52 (Finding the governing international treaties non-dispositive, the court
explained that "[i]t is consequently on the basis of customary international law that the
Court must decide the questions relating to the immunities of such Ministers raised in the
present case.").
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that... certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State,
Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from
jurisdiction in other States, both civil and criminal."' 135
Factually, Belgium simultaneously transmitted an international arrest warrant
for Mr. Abjulaye Yerodia Ndombasi, the former Congolese Minister for Foreign
Affairs, to both the Congo and to INTERPOL on June 7, 2000.136 INTERPOL, the
International Criminal Police Organization, is responsible for "enhanc[ing] and
facilitat[ing] cross-border criminal police co-operation worldwide."' 37 The Court
refused to accede to Belgium's procedural arguments regarding mootness and
justiciability and accepted the case for decision.' 38
The essence of the ICJ decision is that incumbent Foreign Ministers - and, by
analogy, Heads of State - are entirely immune from arrest or prosecution for any
alleged crime by another state. 139 As the Court held,
the functions of a Minister of Foreign Affairs are such that, throughout the duration of his
or her office, he or she when abroad enjoys full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and
inviolability. That immunity and that inviolability protect the individual concerned against
any act of authority of another State which would hinder him or her in the performance of
his or her duties.
140
The important delineation drawn by the ICJ is the circumscribed power of
domestic prosecutions, those undertaken by another state, versus prosecution
before an international tribunal.' 4 ' Finding that international customary law did
not empower Belgium to prosecute a sitting Foreign Minister for even the most
heinous crimes, the ICJ explained:
The Court has carefully examined State practice, including national legislation and those
few decisions of national higher courts, such as the House of Lords or the French Court of
Cassation. It has been unable to deduce from this practice that there exists under
customary international law any form of exception to the rule according immunity from
criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where
they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. 142
135. Id. at para. 51 (emphasis added).
136. Id. atpara. 14.
137. Id.
138. See id. at para. 13 (One of Belgium's arguments addressed the fact that Mr. Yerodia was no
longer serving as the Minister for Foreign Affairs, although he was the Minister when the
arrest warrant was issued).
139. See generally Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, 2002 I.C.J 3, supra note 133.
140. Id. at para. 54 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at para. 58.
142. Id.
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Thus, the ICJ ruled that Belgium had acted improperly and inconsistent with
customary international law in seeking to arrest and prosecute the Congolese
Minister for alleged crimes against humanity. This decision seemingly undermines
the Pinochet precedent and other cases where domestic courts seek to enforce
international treaties and protect against the culture of impunity. In trying to
justify this retreating position, the ICJ hollowly proclaimed that:
The Court emphasizes, however that immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent
Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any
crimes they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity. Immunity from criminal
jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While
jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of
substantive law.
Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain
offences [sic], it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal
responsibility. 1
43
Thus, there are three main extractable points from the ICJ decision. First, and
perhaps foremost, is the fact that customary international law does not yet support
a third state in prosecuting a sitting Foreign Minister or Head of State. Second,
there is a temporal limitation to the procedural immunity enjoyed by such
individuals. Once the position is relinquished, the immunity evaporates. Third,
and most confusing, the ICJ would permit "certain international courts" to try even
incumbent Foreign Ministers or Heads of State. Which "certain criminal courts"
qualify is not entirely made clear by the decision. The three examples proffered in
the decision were the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. What the court intended by "certain
international courts" remains otherwise undefined and will likely require additional
elucidation.
While some may decry the narrow reading of the ICJ's decision as improperly
delimiting customary international law, fidelity to legal decision making mandates
a narrow interpretation. Most courts, both national and international, seek to
proscribe only narrow legal solutions based on tapered readings of the questions
presented. Further, most lawyers recognize the difficulty in analogizing narrow
situations to broaden scarcely established principles of law. In truth, the ICJ
surveyed the immunity landscape and found a very constricted view regarding
evisceration of immunity. If the individual is an incumbent, immunity applies ...
except in "certain" cases like the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. If the prosecution is
143. Id. at para. 60.
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domestic, the sitting Minister or Head of State enjoy absolute inviolability and
cannot be prosecuted, regardless of the gravity of the crime. Finally, the ICJ
echoed the belief of the Congo that "immunity does not mean impunity."' 44
The main question remaining after the ICI's decision was not whether the
Pinochet precedent had been curtailed. Rather, the main question is what courts
and tribunals will perceive constitute "certain international courts." The Special
Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL") provided an answer in 2004.
E. Charles Taylor - A Certain International Court
In May, 2004, the SCSL directly addressed the issue of head of state immunity
and what precisely qualified as an "international court" under the ICJ decision.
Prior to Charles Taylor physically appearing before the Court, the SCSL permitted
Taylor to move to quash the 17-count indictment against him based on
immunity. 145
The SCSL indicted Taylor while he was still the Head of State of Liberia.' 46
Shortly after the indictment was issued, however, Taylor stepped down as
Liberia's president and "was permitted to take up residence in Nigeria."' 147 This
phrasing suggests an initial offer, and acceptance, of exile - one of the historical
approaches to dealing with disempowered rulers. Not deterred by Taylor's
presence in Nigeria or Taylor's new status as a former head of state, the SCSL
assessed Taylor's challenge based on the initial indictment and addressed the head
of state immunity directly. The question presented was "whether it was lawful for
the Special Court to issue an indictment and to circulate an arrest warrant in
respect of a serving Head of State." 148
In denying the prosecution's objection to Taylor's pre-appearance motion to
quash, the SCSL observed that "this case is not in the normal course."'' 49 "To insist
that an incumbent Head of State must first submit to incarceration before he can
raise the question of his immunity ... runs counter, in a substantial manner, to the
144. Id. at para. 48.
145. Prosecutor v. Taylor, Decision on Immunity from Jurisdiction, 128 I.L.R. 239, 246 (Special
Court of Sierra Leone 2004).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 254.
149. Id. at 256. See also, id. at 257 (wherein the SCSL states that "[t]he application with which
this decision is concerned was made when the Applicant was a Head of State. The Appeals
Chamber exercises its inherent power and discretion to permit the Applicant to make this
application notwithstanding the fact that he has not made an initial appearance.").
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whole purpose of the concept of sovereign immunity." 50 Of course, as previously
mentioned, by the time the decision was issued, Taylor was not longer serving as
head of state. This change provided the SCSL an opportunity to also address, or
only address, the implications of arresting a former head of state.
While the legal authority and state practice are growing consistently in favor of
prosecuting former heads of state, the idea of prosecuting a sitting head of state has
not received universal approval and, in many respects, is a more contentious issue.
The Taylor case remains one of only a few decisions where the court considered
whether sovereign immunity, under the Westphalian design, protects an individual
ruler from prosecution as long as he or she remains in power.
Before addressing the immunity issue, the SCSL assessed its power and origin.
As the court readily found, the SCSL is legally distinct from the ICTY, ICTR and
ICC. Unlike the ICTY and ICTR which were developed pursuant to the United
Nations Security Council Chapter VII powers,' 15 the SCSL was
established by the Agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone which was
entered into pursuant to Resolution 1315 (2000) of the Security Council for the sole
purpose of prosecuting persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations
of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of
Sierra Leone. 
152
In this regard, the SCSL is not simply an international tribunal; but rather, the
SCSL is a nuanced hybrid tribunal with both domestic and international qualities.
Unfortunately, the SCSL's opinion demonstrates little appreciation between its
legal origin and that of the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. As the court explains,
it was clear that the power of the Security Council to enter into an agreement for the
establishment of the court was derived from the Charter of the United Nations in both
regard to the general purposes of the United Nations as expressed in Article I of the
Charter and the specific powers of the Security Council in Articles 39 and 41.153
This author, however, sees a meaningful distinction between the genesis of the
SCSL and the Yugoslavian and Rwandan tribunals that mandates a certain level of
cooperation from the international community. Also, the composition of the ICTY
and ICTR judges and prosecutors are entirely international. In contrast, the SCSL
intentionally maintains a domestic character, including its location, which is not
the case with either the ICTY or ICTR - both of which are located in countries
150. Id.
151. See ICTY Statute, supra note 85.
152. Taylor, 128 I.L.R. at 258.
153. Id. at 259.
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outside the area of original conflict. 154
Despite these distinctions, the SCSL evaluated Taylor's immunity challenge as
if the SCSL possessed all the attributes of an international tribunal. Finding the
Agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone sufficiently international
in character, the SCSL reasoned that its originating Agreement "is thus an
agreement between all members of the United Nations and Sierra Leone. This fact
makes the Agreement an expression of the will of the international community.
The Special Court established in such circumstances is truly international."' 5 5 This
conclusion is vulnerable to challenge and may ultimately undermine the immunity
decision rendered. Regardless of the court's self-assessment that the SCSL is "part
of the machinery of international justice," its origin is patently distinct from other,
more purely, international tribunals, like the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. 5 6  This
distinction, following the ICJ's decision in the Democratic Republic of Congo v.
Belgium may prove to be a distinction with a legally relevant difference.
Once the SCSL determined it qualified as one of the "certain international
tribunals" excused from recognizing sovereign immunity, the predicate was
established for finding that Taylor - even as a sitting head of state - was not
entitled to relief from prosecution based on immunity. This author takes issue with
some of the SCSL's reasoning justifying the divestiture of Taylor's head of state
immunity.
First, the SCSL suggested that since December 12, 1950, when the United
Nations' General Assembly adopted the Nuremberg Principles, "the fact that a
person who committed an act which constituted a crime under international law
acted as Head of State or responsible official does not relieve him from
responsibility under law" "became firmly established" international law.' 57 This
finding remarkably ignores the inertia or, perhaps until recently, even apathy
within the international community relating to head of state immunity. Not only
did the international community accept the Netherlands refusal to hand over
Wilhelm following World War I despite a clear violation of Article 27 of the
Treaty of Versailles, the international community also allowed the Allies' defacto
immunity for Emperor Hirohito following World War II. In neither of the great
world wars was a head of state actually prosecuted.
Thus, while the legal notion that head of state and official status does not, in the
154. The ICTY is located in the Hague, Netherlands. The ICTR is located in Arusha, Tanzania.
155. Taylor, 128 I.L.R. at 260 (emphasis in original).
156. Id. at260.
157. Id. at 262-63 (citations omitted).
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abstract, shield one against prosecution may be "firmly established," actual state
practice has not entirely embraced, and certainly has not often followed, this
normative value. The SCSL opinion acknowledges the ICJ's assessment that no
clear state practice for prosecuting heads of state exists in customary international
law even in relation to war crimes and crimes against humanity.1 58 Only in those
international courts established under the United Nations' Chapter VII powers
have claims of immunity been consistently denied. Finding, thereafter, that the
SCSL is not a national court, the court held that "the official position of [Taylor] as
an incumbent Head of State at the time when these criminal proceedings were
initiated against him is not a bar to his prosecution by this court. [Taylor] was and
is subject to criminal proceedings before the Special Court for Sierra Leone."'
159
The legacy of this decision is not yet discernable. What has become clear,
however, is that Charles Taylor now shares a legacy with Slobodan Milogevi6,
Radovan Karad~i6, and Saddam Hussein. The important legal distinction between
these cases remains that the SCSL found that Taylor was not exempt from
prosecution during the time he was a sitting head of state. Milogevi6, Karad~i6 and
Hussein were all subjected to prosecution only after they had been forced from
power.
Charles Taylor now sits in the dock as a criminal defendant. And, much like
Milosevic and Karadzic, Taylor sits in a criminal court far, far away from the
alleged crimes he has committed. While the SCSL is housed in Freetown, the trial
of Taylor was moved to The Hague in the Netherlands for security reasons. Taylor
sits detained in the same facility that once housed Slobodan Milogevi6 and
currently houses Radovan Karad~i6. The distant prosecution has added enormous
cost to the prosecution of Taylor. As recently as March 2009, there were concerns
that the SCSL was running out of money and might have to release Taylor because
it can no longer afford to prosecute him.
The prosecutor of the international criminal court trying former Liberian leader Charles
Taylor said he may go free if international donors do not cover a $5 million shortfall in the
court's budget. There have been mixed reactions to the news in the Liberian capital,
Monrovia. Unlike the international criminal courts for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia,
the special court for Sierra Leone is not funded by mandatory dues. It is supported by
voluntary contributions.
Some of those contributions have slowed as the global economic crisis forced many
developed economies to reconsider spending in the face of growing budget deficits. That
158. Id. at 263.
159. Id. at 265.
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has left the special court's budget $5 million short at a time when it has only one case left
to decide - the 11-count war crimes indictment against Mr. Taylor.
If the money runs out, Prosecutor Stephen Rapp expects defense lawyers to ask for Mr.
Taylor's release. 
160
The undertaking of prosecuting heads of state is indeed a costly endeavor. The
defense fees alone for Mr. Taylor, who was ultimately deemed indigent by the
SCSL, exceed $100,000 per month. The UN-backed tribunal has agreed to provide
approximately $2 million in defense fees on behalf of Taylor. 16' And as the trial
moves into its second year there are estimates that it will cost a total of $89 million
dollars. 62 Justice at this price challenges society during the best of economic
times. Now, in the midst of a worldwide economic crisis, our shared dedication to
eradicating impunity faces perhaps its most critical test. Not can, but will, the
international community continue to seek justice in far away places for crimes that
have gone without prosecution for much of history?
F. Saddam Hussein
Victor's justice is a common term in war crimes trials, not because
the justice is partial, but because victory on the battlefield is its
common prerequisite. 1 63
In 1998, less than a decade before Saddam Hussein was toppled by military
force, captured by American military personnel, and tried before an Iraqi tribunal,
the United States Senate voted 93-0 to adopt a resolution urging the United States
President to formally endorse an international war crimes tribunal to, among other
things, try Saddam Hussein for his alleged crimes against humanity and
genocide. 64 The Senate's strongly worded resolution should have served as a
harbinger of America's resolution to see this dictator, ultimately, face a judicial
160. Scott Steams, Former Liberian Leader Charles Taylor Could Go Free, VOICE OF AMERICA
NEWS, Mar. 4, 2009, http://www.voanews.com/english/2009-03-04-voa32.cfm.
161. Times Online & David Charter, Charles Taylor Boycotts War Crimes Trial, TIMES ONLINE,
June 4, 2007, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africaarticle I 880969.ece.
162. Id.
163. Ruth Wedgewood, International Criminal Law and Augusto Pinochet, 40 VA. J. INT'L L.
829, 834 (2000).
164. S. Con. Res. 78, 105th Cong. (1998) (The title of the Resolution was "Relating to the
indictment and prosecution of Saddam Hussein for war crimes and other crimes against
humanity. The Resolution was reported without any Amendment).
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reckoning.165  Ironically, the United States has never provided its own official
support for the International Criminal Court, limiting its participation to policy
development as a non-state party. Still, as early as 1997, the legislative branch of
the United States' government began issuing resolutions regarding prosecuting
dictators and former heads of state, including Hussein, Pol Pot and Hun Sen. ' 66
Thus, when Saddam Hussein was found hiding in a "spider hole" near his
hometown of Tikrit, it should have come as no surprise that the capturing
American forces would want to see him tried. 167 The place of trial, however, and
the composition of Hussein's tribunal, bore little similarity to the Senate
Resolution passed just 8 years earlier. The calls for an international tribunal, or
even a hybrid tribunal, were not heeded. Rather, despite a burgeoning variety of
international approaches to prosecuting alleged war criminals, the Allied Forces
and nascent Iraqi government opted to try Hussein before a domestic Iraqi tribunal,
the Iraqi Special Tribunal ("IST"). 168 Hussein was charged by the IST through an
Accusation Document, which alleged that Hussein committed crimes against
humanity involving the deaths of 148 individuals from the town of Dujail after a
failed assassination attempt against Hussein.1
69
165. The Senate Resolution followed a similarly worded resolution that was submitted to the
Committee on Foreign Relations Committee, S. Res. 179, 105th Cong. (1998), just one
month earlier on February 23, 1998.
166. H.R. Con. Res. 205, 105th Cong. (1997) (calling for the prosecution of Pol Pot for crimes
against humanity in Cambodia); H.R. Res. 533, 105th Cong. (1998) (expressing the House
of Representatives' belief that Hun Sen committed war crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide in Cambodia).
167. How Saddam Hussein Was Captured, BBC NEWS (December 15, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middleeast/3317881.stm. The BBC reported that Hussein was
hiding in a hole across the Tigris river where he had previously built grand palaces. The
"spider hole" was an "underground chamber" between six to eight feet deep, "with enough
space for a person to lie down, and an air vent and extractor fan." Id. The BBC also
reported that when American soldiers looked inside the hole, Hussein clearly appeared like
he wanted to surrender. Hussein reportedly stated in English "[m]y name is Saddam
Hussein. I am the president of Iraq and I want to negotiate." Id. The arresting special
American forces purportedly replied "Regards from President Bush." Id
168. Law No. 10 (2005), Law of the Supreme Iraqi Tribunal, 47 Al-Waqa'i Al-Iraqiya (Oct.
2005), available at http://www.loc.gov/law/help/hussein/present.html; See also Leslie
Scheuermann, Victor's Justice? The Lessons of Nuremberg Applied to the Trial of Saddam
Hussein, 15 TUL. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 291, 293 (2006) (The Iraqi Special Tribunal was
established in December, 2003. (citation needed). (A translation is needed to check the
substance of this citation, as well as the appropriate way to cite the document, although
from the website it does not provide support for the assertion that the tribunal was
established instead of an international tribunal).
169. Accusation Document, Republic of Iraq v. Saddam Hussein AI-Makid, et al. (Iraqi High
Tribunal, May 15, 2006) available at
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Officially, the interim Iraqi government is credited with the IST's
establishment.17 0 One of the most troubling aspects of the IST was the selection
and composition of judges. 17 1 For example, former Ba'ath Party members were
prohibited from participating as judges, leaving only low-level and inexperienced
judges as the arbiters of Hussein's purported crimes.' 72 Similarly, individuals who
were personally persecuted under the Hussein regime were not precluded from
sitting as judges. 173
As one commenter observed, "[t]he exclusion of former Ba'athists and the
presence of Ba'ath victims as IST judges created a politically polarized tribunal"
which many observers could challenge as partial, biased and assured of a
conviction.' 74 Such approach to "justice" is neither just, nor wise. With all the
evidence against Hussein, there really was no need to create a court that would
assuredly convict him. Rather, the interim Iraqi government should have sought to
emulate past and current war crime tribunal models. Because the IST was
structured to secure convictions, rather than render justice, it is unlikely that future
courts or countries will rely on IST decisions for precedential value.
Security was also a major concern before the IST. In 2005, two of Hussein's
defense attorneys were killed, one after being abducted in his office and another in
a drive-by shooting. 75 On June 21, 2006, a third attorney representing Saddam
Hussein before the IST was murdered.17 6 Security in Iraq continues to be a major
source of concern with the majority of participants at the IST being forced to live
inside walled compounds protected by United States forces. 77 The killings and
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/20060515 indictment_transsaddamhuss
ein.pdf.
170. Id.
171. Heidi M. Spallholz, Note, Saddam Hussein and the IST on Trial: The Case for the ICC, 13
BUFF. HUM RTS. L. REV. 255, 283 (2007).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 284.
174. Id. at 285.
175. Abducted Saddam Trial Lawyer Found Dead, ASSOCIATED PRESS, October 21, 2005,
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9764852/; James Rupert, Second Saddam Trial
Lawyer Killed, Los ANGELES TIMES, November 9, 2005 available at
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/wire/ny-
woiraq094505 015novO9,0,5678809.story.
176. John F. Bums & Christine Hauser, Third Saddam Lawyer is Killed in Baghdad, N.Y.
TIMES, June 21, 2006 available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/21/world/middleeast/21 cnd-
lawyer.htmlscp=3&sq=3rd%20Saddam20Lawyer%/o20is%2Killed/20in%/20Baghdad&
st=cse.
177. Id.
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security concerns "renewed doubts about whether it is possible to hold a fair trial
in the midst of a conflict that has spurred revenge killings."'
' 78
Despite the murder of three of Hussein's defense lawyers, neither a mistrial nor
transfer of the proceedings to a neutral and secure country was ever seriously
considered. The third defense attorney who was killed had previously remarked
that "[w]e think that it's impossible to hold a trial in Baghdad under these security
conditions, and that the court should be transferred to a location outside Iraq."'
179
His requests for transfer went unanswered. Yet, the modem international
approach, including the prosecution of Prime Minister Kambanda before the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the prosecutions of Slobodan
Milogevi6, Milan Milutinovi6, Radovan Karad2i6 before the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia, and the prosecution of Charles Taylor before the Special
Court for Sierra Leone, which, solely for Taylor's individual prosecution, was
transferred for security reasons to The Hague, appreciates the need for fairness and
security over proximity to the victims. Unlike the international practice supporting
trials in an unbiased and physically secure environment, Saddam Hussein was
permitted to be tried in an atmosphere of revenge, insecurity and thirst for
"justice," however formulated and delivered. Thus, Hussein's conviction and
execution will not likely become a viable precedent regarding head of state
prosecution. Rarely will the international community permit such an emotionally-
infused "trial" to be conducted before judges that were personally persecuted by
the accused's policies in a physically insecure environment.
Military defeat and military occupation in Iraq was similar to the circumstances
facing the World War II tribunals. 80  Security, however, was not nearly as
menacing a factor at Nuremberg or Tokyo as it was in Iraq. Further, both World
War II tribunals had an international composition, ensuring that those who had
actually been victimized by the defendants were not the sole judges of the alleged
crimes. In Iraq, the IST contains judges who were all negatively affected by the
actions of Saddam Hussein and, yet, they judge. Were this trial to take place
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Paust, supra note 10, at 208 (Professor Paust notes that head of state trials often follow
military defeat:
During the U.S. Revolutionary War, there were suggestions that the
King of England and others be prosecuted for their "War against the
natural rights of all Mankind," but there had been no capture of the
King of England by the Americans and no such trials took place).
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elsewhere and were the United States not such a visible, albeit silent, partner to the
proceedings, one can be sure that the IST would be condemned as a mere "show
trial." Instead, the trial proceeded amidst a backdrop of civil insurgencies and
physical safety threats.
In the end, Hussein's guilty verdict will be less historically relevant than the
procedural aspects of his conviction and the composition of the IST. Did Hussein
receive "due process," a nebulous, but commonly accepted term relating to
criminal trials? Was the IST simply an arm of the American occupation? Was the
war dethroning Saddam illegal, thereby achieving "justice" in literal violation of
international law? Are some goals - prosecution of criminal dictators, for example
- more worthy than securing the sovereign status of independent nation states?
Does might simply make right . . . or, does its presence merely silence opposition?
In contrast to the international and hybrid tribunals wherein the trials of former
heads of state have taken years to pursue, with many witnesses and exhibits being
laboriously considered, barely three years expired between the caputre and
execution of Hussein. Hussein was captured by American Special Forces in
December 2003 and executed in December 2006.181 A verdict of guilty for crimes
against humanity based on the killing of 148 persons in the town of Dujail was
handed down by the IST on November 5, 2006. 11 Hussein's lawyers filed an
appeal. The IST's appellate chamber began reviewing the case on December 5,
2006.183 Approximately three weeks later Hussein was executed. 84
Such abbreviated appellate review followed what some believed to be an unfair
trial. Human Rights Watch ("HRW"), a preeminent international human rights
organization, called the Hussein trial "fundamentally unfair" and his death
sentence "indefensible."' 185 In a ninety-seven page report reviewing Hussein's IST
trial, "Human Rights Watch said Hussein's trial 'was marred by so many
procedural and substantive flaws that the verdict is unsound." 86 The HRW report
181. Aneesh Raman, et. al., Hussein Executed with "Fear in his Face, " CNN.COM, Dec. 30,
2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006IWORLD/meast/I2/29/hussein/index.html.
182. Id.
183. Sam Dagher & Jomana Karadsheh, Iraqi Appeals Court Upholds Hussein Death Sentence,
CNN.CoM Dec. 26, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/12/26/iraq.main/index.html.
184. Id. (In response to the appellate ruling, the White House issued a statement: "Today marks
a milestone for the Iraqi people's efforts to replace the rule of a tyrant with the rule of
law.").
185. Hussein Trial 'Fundamentally Unfair', CNN.COM, Nov. 20, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/i11/20/saddam.trial.unfair/index.html.
186. Id.
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further challenged that the IST allowed the prosecution to undermine several
guarantees inherent in fair trials under international law, including the presumption
of innocence, trial before an impartial court, trial before an independent court and
the right to prepare a defense and cross-examine witnesses.187 In contrast to the
HRW report, the White House issued a statement immediately following Hussein's
execution praising the Iraqi people for giving Hussein a fair trial. 1
88
What will be remembered of Hussein's guilty verdict and swift execution is
unclear at this point. What will not likely be achieved, however, is a valid legal
precedent applicable in future trials. In this case, justice may be fleeting. And, to
many, a conviction was worth any price. Sadly, the opportunity to have a
transparent, internationally fair trial as once envisioned by Senate Resolution was
not what occurred. Instead, the Hussein precedent is vulnerable to international
criticism. The ultimate fate of Saddam Hussein was that he was tried and executed
by his enemies - both literally and figuratively.
G. Milan Milutinovic
The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia ("ICTY") has undoubtedly
been the most aggressive and most consistent prosecutor of former heads of state.
To date, three separate former heads of state have faced trial before the ICTY.
189
At that date this article went to press, the trial of two of the defendant heads of
state had been completed. Of course, as a previous section of this article makes
clear, the trial of Slobodan Milogevi6 was prematurely terminated due to his death
while in custody at The Hague. His colleague, Milan Milutinovi6, however, lived
to see his trial completed and his name cleared.
On February 26, 2009, in one of the most un-heralded international prosecutions
against a former head of state, the former President of Serbia was acquitted of all
charges of war crimes for his activities occurring in Kosovo.' 90  The Trial
187. Id.
188. Raman et. al., President Bush's statement read as follows: "Fair trials were unimaginable
under Saddam Hussein's tyrannical rule. It is a testament to the Iraqi people's resolve to
move forward after decades of oppression that, despite his terrible crimes against his own
people, Saddam Hussein received a fair trial." Id.
189. See generally the ICTY website, www.icty.org for fuller information about each case and
each defendant (Slobodan Milogevi6 was the first former head of state to be subject to trial.
He died in custody before a verdict was rendered against him. Milan Milutinovi6 was the
second former head of state to be tried. And, following the capture and transfer of Radovan
Karadzic to the ICTY in 2009, after 13 years in hiding, a third former head of state will face
justice).
190. Prosecutor v. Milutinovi6, et al, Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment Volume 3, para. 1207
The Emperor's Clothes
Chamber's decision marked the first time that the ICTY had ruled on crimes
perpetrated by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbian forces against
Kosovo Albanians during the 1999 Kosovo conflict. 19 1 While President
Milutinovi6 was originally named in the indictment with his colleague Slobodan
Milogevi6 in May, 1999, a decision was made to try Milogevi6 individually.
192
Thus, Milutinovi6 was tried with five other Serbian officials for displacing,
deporting, murdering and persecuting Kosovo Albanians. 1
93
The indictment against Milutinovi6 and his five co-defendants alleged a joint
criminal enterprise responsible fro the deportation of 800,000 Albanians during the
1999 Kosovo conflict.' 94 In addition, the indictment charged that the defendants
were culpable for internal displacements, the burning of homes, sexual assaults and
the destruction of Albanian cultural and religious sites. 195 Finally, the indictment
charged that the defendants sought to "modi[fy] ... the ethnic balance in
Kosovo ... to ensure ... Serbian control .. ." by using threats of force, actual
force and acts of violence and the deliberate destruction of property such that those
Albanians who were not literally displaced chose to fled to avoid these crimes. 196
Milutinovi6 served as the President of Serbia from December, 1997 through
December, 2002.197 Thus, Milutinovi6 was the second former Head of State
subjected to trial before the ICTY. After leaving the Presidency, Milutinovi6
voluntarily surrendered to the ICTY in 2003.198 After a 285 day trial, 113
prosecution witnesses, 1,455 prosecution exhibits, 118 defense witnesses and 2896
defense exhibits, the Trial Chamber found that Milutinovi6 lacked the necessary
criminal intent and that he had not made any significant contribution to the
(Feb. 26 2009).
191. Id.
192. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, et al., Case No. IT-99-37, Indictment, (May 24, 1999) available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/ind/en/mil-ii990524e.pdf; Prosecutor v.
Mulutinovic, et. al., Case No. IT-99-37-PT, Third Amended Indictment, (Jul. 19, 2002)
available at http://www.icty.orglx/cases/milutinovic/ind/en/milu-3ai020905e.pdf.
193. Prosecutor v. Multunovic, et. al., Case No. IT-05-87-PT, Third Amended Joinder
Indictment, para.para. 72, 73, 75, 77 (Jun. 06, 2006) available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/milutinovic/ind/en/milu-3aji060621e.pdf. MulutinoviC's co-
defendants were Nikola Sainovic; Dragoljub Ojdanic; Nebojsa Pavkovic; Vladimir
Lazarevic; and, Sreten Lukic.
194. Id. at para. 72.
195. Id.
196. Id. at para.para. 19, 25-27.
197. Id. atpara. 1.
198. Id.
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criminal enterprise. 199 In fact, the Trial Chamber held that Milutinovi6 did not
have any actual control or command over the military forces that engaged in
forcible expulsions and internal displacements of Kosovo Albanians. 200 Instead,
the Trial Chamber indicated that the late Slobodan Milogevi6, rather than
Milutinovi6, actually exercised control over the VJ, or Yugoslavian Army.20 This
is the closest the ICTY or any other international tribunal may come to laying guilt
at the feet of the now deceased Slobodan Milogevi. While his trial was never
completed, the Trial Chamber's commentary in dicta confirms, at least from a
historical perspective, what the ICTY was unable to accomplish in a direct
criminal proceeding against Milogevi6: that Milogevi6 was indeed responsible for
crimes committed against Kosovo Albanians.
The Trial Chamber's treatment of Milutinovi's five co-defendants was not so
gracious. The five named co-defendants were all found guilty of at least some of
the crimes alleged and received sentences ranging from fifteen to twenty-two
202years. This case confirms what many in the international community believe -
namely that even former heads of state will receive a fair trial and fair verdict. The
ICTY did pursue and try Milutinovi6. His acquittal merely serves to remind all
that justice, when sought for victims, still will ultimately be resolved only after
receiving witness testimony and evidence. And, the risk of prosecution always
entails the potential for a non-guilty verdict.
H. Radovan Karadjie
Radovan Karad~i6 was initially indicted by the ICTY regarding his alleged
crimes in Bosnia and Herzegovina in July 1995. A few months later, in November
1995, Karadi6 was indicted again for his alleged crimes in Srebrenica. In both
instances, Karad~i6 was a sitting head of state and the President of the Serbian
Democratic Party. Shortly after his indictment, Karad i6 continued to direct the
police and politics in the Serbian controlled part of Bosnia. 203 However, Karad~i6
199. Multunovic, et. al., Case No. IT-05-87-T, Judgment at para. 276.
200. Id. at para. 279.
201. Id. at para. 274.
202. Id. at para.para. 1208-12. Three of the criminal defendants received twenty-two year
sentences: Sainovic, Pavkovic and Lukic. The remaining two defendants received
sentences of fifteen years: Ojdanic and Lazarevic.
203. Raymond Bonner, Bosnia Election Campaign Postponed Over Karadzic Issue, N.Y.TIMES,
Jul. 16, 1996, at A3 available at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/16/world/bosnia-
election-campaign-postponed-over-karadzic-
issue.html?n=Top%2FReference%2FTimes%20Topics%2FSubjects%2F1%2FIntemational
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was prohibited from running for national elections based on an agreement in the
Dayton Peace Accords.
2 0 4
Diplomatic and NATO police efforts failed during the next thirteen years to
capture Karadi. In mid-1996, it became clear that a diplomatic solution was not
attainable.20 5 And, in one of the most telling examples of how realpolitik controls
international attempts at prosecution, the New York times reported that as an
American presidential election was quickly approaching, then President Bill
Clinton feared "American casualties or a wholesale unraveling of the Bosnian
peace effort - clear risks of military action." 20 6 Without military intervention and
without diplomatic intercession, Karad~i6 enjoyed freedom from arrest in his home
country for many, many years.
As the world seemed paralyzed by inertia, Karad~i6 began a new life hiding in
plain sight. For thirteen years, Karad~i6 managed to avoid NATO forces and avoid
capture until such time as the political will of his country caught up to that of the
international community and the ICTY. As one commentator observed:
He was nabbed not by NATO, whose forces had spent 12 years in a vain and sometimes
desultory search for him, but by the security forces of Serbia - the country whose designs
for grandeur he had so ardently tried to further. In the end, it seems, political will rather
than operational cunning is the force that will bring Karadzic, 63, to a court in The Hague
to face charges of genocide and crimes against humanity in Bosnia from 1992 to 1995.
Karad~i6 had been "hiding" in Serbia as a poet and natural healer.20 8 He took
on a new name, a new identity and successfully avoided arrest for well over a
decade. However, when newly-elected President Boris Tadi6 took office, he
vowed to work with the European Union to secure Serbia's admission into the
regional body. 0 9  The price? Cooperate in bringing Karad~i6 and Mladi6 to
justice.210
While Mladi6 continues to avoid capture, Karad~i6 was arrested in the Serbian
%20Relations&scp=2&sq=Bosnia%20Campaign%20Postponed,%2OGiving%2OSerbs%20
More%20Time%20to%200ust%20Karadzic&st=cse.
204. Id. (The Dayton Peace Accords ended the Bosnia war); see Dejan Anastasjevic, Karadzic
Called to Reckoning, TIMECOM, Jul. 23, 2008,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1825873,00.html.
205. Bonner, supra note 203.
206. Id.
207. Anastasjevic, supra note 204.
208. Id. (Vladimir Vukcevic, Serbia's special war crimes prosecutor, remarked that "[h]e was
very convincing." Goran Kojic, editor of Healthy Life magazine in Belgrade, stated that
"[h]e looked like a cross between Sigmund Freud and a beat poet.").
209. Id.
210. Id.
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capital of Belgrade and transferred to The Hague. He now sits in the prison where
his colleague, Slobodan Milogevi6, spent his last years.21' Since his first
indictment, the ICTY has issued two amended indictments against Karadik and,
most recently, following his capture, a Third Amended Indictment.
212
The Third Amended Indictment charges Karadli6 in eleven counts with two
counts of genocide, and several counts of war crimes and crimes against
humanity. 213 The genocide counts allege a joint criminal enterprise that sought to
permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb
claimed territory and a joint criminal enterprise to eliminate Bosnian Muslims in
Srebrenica by killing men and boys and removing women.2 14 The remaining nine
counts asserts charges that Karad~i6 engaged in persecutions and exterminations
based on political, racial and religious grounds, including killings, tortures,
beatings, rape and other acts of sexual violence, forcible transfers and deportations,
forced labor and plunder of property.
215
Because the trial proceedings were in the early stages when this article went to
print, one can only speculate that his trial will follow some of the same
obstructionist strategies employed by Slobodan Milogevi6. Much like his
predecessor in the criminal dock, Karad~i6 refused to enter a plea in his case and
challenges the legitimacy of the tribunal.21 6 As the BBC reported, Karad~i6
reiterated that Richard Holbrooke had negotiated Karad~i6's immunity from
prosecution during the Dayton Peace Accord negotiations.
217
During his initial hearing Karad~i6 proclaimed:
I am challenging the jurisdiction of this tribunal on the basis of my agreement with the
211. Mike Corder, Karadzic Arrives at The Hague, THE N.Y. SUN, Jul. 30, 2008,
http://www.nysun.com/foreign/karadzic-extradited-to-the-hague/82898/.
212. See Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Case No. IT-95-5-1, Indictment (Jul. 24, 1995);
Prosecutor v. Karadzic & Mladic, Case No. IT-95-18-I, Indictment (Nov. 14, 1995);
Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Amended Indictment (Apr. 28, 2000); Prosecutor v. Karadzic, Case
No. IT-95-5/18-PT, Second Amended Indictment (Feb. 18, 2009); Prosecutor v. Karadzic,
Case Nos. IT-95-5/18-PT, D13085- D12971, Third Amended Indictment (Feb. 27, 2009)
(The first Amended Indictment was issued on April 28, 2000. Then, nine years later and
following Karadzic's arrest, the ICTY issued a Prosecutor's Second Amended Indictment
on February 18, 2009 and, on February 27, 2009, issued a Third Amended Indictment).
213. Karadzic, Case Nos. IT-95-5/18-PT, D13085- D12971, Third Amended Indictment, at
para.para. 36-87.
214. Id at para. 42.
215. Id. at para. 48-87.
216. Defiant Karadzic Refuses to Plead, BBC NEWS, Mar. 3, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7920594.stm [hereinafter Defiant Karadzic].
217. Id.
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international community whose representative at that point in time was Mr Richard
Holbrooke .... I am defending a principle here; that wars cannot be concluded and peace
agreements cannot be signed by deceit.
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The Trial Chamber assured Karad~i6 that his claim of a negotiated immunity
would be assessed in due time. Still, it appears that in the next few years, a
historical record will be made of Karadi6's alleged crimes and, absent any
unexpected circumstances, a verdict rendered. Because of the international
acceptance of the legitimacy of the ICTY, the Karad~i6 case, unlike the Hussein
case, will undoubtedly build upon the prosecuting heads of state precedent.
The crimes Karad2i6 is accused of committing are hauntingly reminiscent of
World War II and the promises of "never again." Labor camps and massive
deportations remind all why individuals should be held accountable for crimes
regardless of official position. Yet, the gravity of the crimes did not result in
Karadi6's arrest and transfer until some other marker was placed on the table -
not simply justice, but inclusion in world governance via the European Union.
While one can only celebrate the legal rejoinder that Karad~i6 now faces, the
international community must face its own complicity in the delay in bringing
Karad~i6 to justice.
L Omar AI-Bashir
On March 4, 2009, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for
the current Sudanese Head of State, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir.21 9 This
warrant is notable because it marks the first time the ICC has charged a sitting
head of state. By doing so, the ICC has potentially endangered a fragile peace in
the Darfur region - a region where many believe genocide concerns remain.
The arrest warrant, however, does not charge Al Bashir with genocide. Despite
the Prosecutor's request that Al Bashir be charged with genocide, war crimes and
crimes against humanity, the arrest warrant, covering a five year period in Sudan,
alleges that Al Bashir committed only war crimes and crimes against humanity. 220
The charging instrument accuses Al Bashir of committing pillage as a war crime
and "directing attacks against a civil population as such or against individual
218. Id.
219. Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, Case No. ICC -02/05-01/09, Warrant of
Arrest for Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, (Mar, 4, 2009) available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf.
220. Id. at 3,7-8.
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civilians not taking direct part in hostilities as a war crime ... ,,221 Additionally,
the arrest warrant accuses Al Bashir of murder, extermination, forcible transfers,
torture and rape as crimes against humanity.
222
The essence of the arrest warrant seeks to place responsibility on Al Bashir for
his participation as "an indirect perpetrator, or as an indirect co-perpetrator" for the
governmental policy of unlawful attacks against the civilian population in
Darfur.223 Al Bashir is considered by the ICC to be both the "dejure and defacto
President of the State of Sudan and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudanese Armed
Forces" for the five year period in question - March 2003 through July 2008.224 In
this role, the arrest warrant declares, Al Bashir "played an essential role in
coordinating, with other high-ranking Sudanese political and military leaders, the
design and implementation of the above-mentioned [government] counter-
insurgency campaign. 225
Al Bashir was openly defiant in his criticism of the Court. Al Bashir told
supporters that the ICC could "eat" the arrest warrant.226 He further commented
that the warrant will "not be worth the ink it is written on" as he danced for
thousands of cheering supporters while an effigy of the ICC prosecutor was
burned.227 In the capital city of Khartoum, thousands of government supporters
reportedly gathered to show their continuing support of Al Bashir by chanting "We
love you President Bashir." 228 Sudan, which is not a state party to the ICC, 229 is
still encouraged through its United Nations membership to comply with the court's
directives, including arrest warrants.
The Associated Press reported that Sudanese state radio has been beginning
each morning broadcast with the proclamation: "Long live Sudan, free and
defiant., 230 There is no immediate plan to arrest or capture AI-Bashir. Instead, Al-
221. Id. at 7.
222. Id. at 7-8.
223. Id. at 3, 8.
224. Id. at 6-7.
225. Bashir, supra note 219, at 7.
226. Warrant Issued for Sudan's leader, BBC NEWS, Mar.4, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7923102.stm [hereinafter Warrant for Sudan's Leader].
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. International Criminal Court website, www.icc-cpi.int (listing the States Parties to the
Rome Statute) (last visited March 11, 2009).
230. Associated Press, Standoff over Sudan President Could Drag On, HINDUSTAND TIMES,
Mar. 12, 2009,
http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/StoryPage.aspx?sectionName=RSSFeed-
World&id=24c95f9e- 17a6-454c-be69-
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Bashir intends to travel to friendly Arab and African countries, such as Qatar,
where he knows he will be protected from transfer to the ICC. 2 3 I Western
countries are struggling to devise a method for arresting Al-Bashir as his
popularity as home remains relatively strong. 2 The Associated Press reported
that "[t]he prosecutor at [the ICC] has suggested forcing down Al-Bashir's plane if
he travels abroad, but Western governments are likely to be deterred by the sure
backlash from Arab countries to any such move."
233
Not all countries support the ICC's action. Egypt indicated that it was "greatly
disturbed" by the issuance of an arrest warrant and sought a meeting of the United
Nations Security Council. 234 Likewise, Russia characterized the arrest warrant as
"dangerous precedent." 235 Both Russia and China, two members of the United
Nations Security Council, oppose any sanctions against Sudan. 236  While the
United Nations Secretary General implored Sudan to fully cooperate with the ICC,
a Sudanese expert, Alex de Waal expressed opinion that the warrant, at least at this
juncture, was "pretty toothless. 237 The two previous ICC arrest warrants issued
against Sudanese officials, Humanitarian Affairs Minister Ahmed Haroun and
Janjaweed militia leader Ali Abdul Rahman, have not yet resulted in any arrest or
23823prosecution.  Not surprisingly, Sudan has refused to turn the accused over.239
One can only wonder why the ICC and its prosecutor seem to think that the
warrant against a seemingly popular head of state will be any different.
Thus, without having any current method to secure the arrest of Al Bashir, the
ICC, nonetheless, issued the arrest warrant and will move forward with an
attempted prosecution. But, in absentia prosecutions are not permitted under the
Rome Statute that established the ICC. The international community must
therefore wait until Al Bashir either voluntarily relinquishes power or is otherwise
removed from power. Any hope of exile has vanished and the situation in Sudan
remains volatile. 240 Proof of this volatility can be found in the Sudan's immediate
08db4f2b2a69&Headline=Standoff+over+Sudan+president+could+drag+on.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Warrant for Sudan's Leader, supra note 226.
235. Id.
236. Associated Press, supra note 230.
237. Warrant for Sudan's Leader, supra note 226.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Associated Press, supra note 230. The Associated Press reported that "[m]any observers
fear the small hopes for a compromise have grown even smaller."
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reaction to the arrest warrant: numerous aid agencies were asked to leave the
country. And, within the first few days following the arrest warrant, five aid
workers were kidnapped.24' While some suggest that ordering aid agencies out of
Sudan itself qualifies as an additional war crime, the suggestion is of little help in
the moment where thousands of residents literally rely on this aid for survival.242
Some may assert that the statement being made by the ICC, even if Al Bashir is
never arrested or prosecuted, is worth the risk of aid leaving the country. Yet a
quiet exile may have provided both a more immediate and lasting solution. As the
international community welcomes the news of an arrest warrant - from a
normative perspective - it is difficult to ignore the reality on the ground in Sudan
that this arrest warrant may only exacerbate the suffering of any already vulnerable
civilian population.
243
VI. The Undressing of the Emperor - Living in Reality
Essequam videri
44
There often seems little difference between the kings called tyrants and those free from
such reproach - except perhaps with regard to their political fortunes. By and large, in the
chronicles and history books, only deposed kings are called tyrants, though we have no
reason to believe and there would be no way of demonstrating that only those kings (or all
those kings) who overrode the fundamental laws of their kingdoms were deposed. 245
While many profess the new age of prosecution has arrived, the evidence belies
such optimistic cheers. The modern trials of Hussein, Milogevi6, Karad~i6 and
Taylor, pale in comparison to the many instances of former rules living in exile -
many of whom are there with the inconspicuous support, if not approval, of the
international community. For every Milogevi6, there are three to five dictators that
have successfully averted a legal reckoning. Either no bounty has been leveled
upon them or their host state is immune to such economic threats or the risk of
military action is not worth the slight reward.
The sporadic legal precedent that exists in this area is so unique to each
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. ("The first international attempt to prosecute a sitting head of state is likely to turn into a
long standoff, with the people of Darfur suffering the most.").
244. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 821 (1974) ("to be rather than to seem").
245. WALZER, supra note 2 at 38.
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individual that it is difficult to find any current case where the issue will be
decisively settled. Yes, Pinochet saw his immunity evaporate internationally and
his immunity erased at home. Still, he was never actually prosecuted. Likewise,
the Saudi government's refusal to rescind the "welcome" for Idi Amin meant he
died in relative peace without any threat of prosecution. Charles Taylor was given
express immunity from prosecution in the Lom6 Peace Accords only to witness a
court's refusal to embrace the political solution that helped end his reign of terror.
Slobodan Milogevi6 was protected by his President only to have his Prime Minister
assist the United States in surreptitiously "extraditing" him to The Hague under
cover of darkness. Hussein was arrested under the auspices of a war to rid the
world of weapons of mass destruction - a basis which has been proven to be either
false or falsified. Radovan Karad~i6 was finally captured some thirteen years after
living incognito within the comfortable borders of his homeland. And, the
perpetual inertia in relation to the Cambodian genocide meant that Pol Pot died
without ever seriously facing a threat of criminal prosecution.
The issue of head of state immunity is far from settled. 46 What is needed is a
clear and unambiguous approach taken by the international community. The
existing framework has not secured equal justice and does little to promise
consistency in the future. While this author wishes things were different, they
simply are not. The current modus operandi seems to involve two consistent
variables: military defeat and/or economic sanctions that motivate extradition. In
cases where the constellation of variables does not perfectly align, the offers of
exile trump any claim that head of state immunity is dead. And, in the end, is
removal from power and ostracizing such a poor solution?
If peace is the goal, then any removal of a criminal dictator and restoration of
democracy yields some measure of success. Because so many nation states
continue to accept, or shield already accepted former dictators, and protect them
against extradition, does this not demonstrate a sufficient incapacitation? Exile
equates to "house arrest" within a particular nation and precludes international
travel and influence from a deposed "has-been." This disempowerment is a
punishment unto itself but does not, admittedly, offer the benefits received under a
judicial punishment scheme.
What exile offers that recent prosecutions cannot is protection to civilians from
senseless military conflict within their nation. Thousands upon thousands of Iraqis
246. See Kerry Creque O'Neill, Note, A New Customary Law of Head of State Immunity?:
Hirohito and Pinochet, 38 STAN. J. INT'L L. 289 (2002).
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have paid with their lives to secure the prosecution of a single individual. And, no
individual is worth such a hefty price. Instead, had Saddam only taken the initial
offer of exile - one the international community was willing to accept - Iraq would
likely be a much freer and safer nation.
Without assurance that peace treaties generating immunity deals will actually
protect individuals, many dictators may not see an advantage in stepping down. In
order to secure peace - a necessary predicate to justice - the political calculus has
to present an attractive enough offer to peacefully remove dictators from power.
With the Special Court in Sierra Leone rejecting the Lomd Peace Accords and
Karadzic claiming that he was granted immunity during the Dayton Peace Accord
process, modem heads of state, like Omar Al-Bashir, may be increasingly reticent
to enter into a peace accord or, more importantly, to step down from power.
Why, then, not focus on the viability of exile as an alternative to military
occupation? Why not use military forces only to secure exile and assist countries
in moving toward democracy without sacrificing any more lives. Why not simply
let Nigeria "welcome" Charles Taylor without putting up billions of dollars for a
court that, ultimately, may not render a verdict in his case and has drawn financial
contributions away from resurrecting Sierra Leone. Is the prosecution of a single
individual worth the billions of dollars that could otherwise have been invested in
rebuilding a worn-torn nation? Why not encourage aid agencies to remain in
Darfur, a nation where genocide is feared to be ongoing, and offer AI-Bashir an
attractive alternative to an ICC arrest warrant?
Peace does not always require prosecution.247 In fact, many societies have
progressed into peaceful democracies without any legal prosecutions and criminal
punishments. As the head of state immunity issue continues to occupy the
international legal landscape, a less myopic vision may be necessary to secure
peace. Following the divestiture of the Lom6 Peace Accords by a subsequently
constructed hybrid tribunal, what leader will, in the future, voluntarily agree to step
down and release power? And, regardless of the decision of whether to prosecute,
fidelity to legal principles should remain above all others. For, if we prosecute
only by circumventing the law or by crafting new legal principles onto aged
parchment used for other purposes, we, too, have become complicit in the
eradication of human rights. How we treat those least deserving of justice will be
247. Colloquium, Pinochet Revisited, 95 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 139, 141 (2001) ("There are
times when reconciliation and forgiveness are more helpful to a society than retribution and
punishment, and it is for the legitimate government to decide which path to follow.").
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the measure of the justness of our international society.
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